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ABSTRACT 
Meaning of.-terhD'rim has been changing over the years. 
Violence and intimidation has always been a part of it. Terrorism can 
be used both by the opposition and by the state. Terrorism can be 
the act of an individual or can be the act of a group. 
Many theories have been enunciated to deal with its 
causes in terms of alienation, social and economic factors and 
ideological linkages, This dissertation attempts to look at the individual 
and organizational aspect of terrorism. It assumes that the individual 
and the organization are inthnsically connected. In this it looks at the 
social, economic and historical conditions as preconditions and events 
as precipitants in the process of terrorism. The relation of the individual 
with the group becomes very strong. The organisation becomes like 
political families. They have their process and ideologies which may 
hinder the individual to come out of it once he realises his mistake or 
strengthen his resolve to carry on. 
An attempt has been made to study the terrorist 
organisations in Jammu and Kashmir. In this special emphasis has 
been paid to the study of Harkat-ul-Ansar and Hizbul Muzahideen. 
The choice of these two organizations was made not 
only because they had been very actively involved in increasing 
militancy in the states but also because they have a lot of support 
from other countries; Harkat-ul-Ansar has been declared a terrorist 
organization by the United States and has the blessings of Saudi 
billionaire Osama Bin Laden. The Hizbul Muzahideen is the militant 
wing of the Jamaat-e-islami, a socio-cultural organization of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Both these organisations are funded by the ISI and 
are considered among the deadliest organisations operating in India. 
Harkat-UI-Ansar has mostly foreign terrorists. Since 1996, practically 
all acts of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir have been carried out by 
the Lashkar, which is the militant wing of the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, 
the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), formerly known as the Harkat-ul-
Ansar, which has been declared by the US as an international terrorist 
organisation since October, 1997, the HM, which is the militant wing 
of the Jamat-e-lslami of Kashmir, and the Al Badr, a splinter group of 
the HM. The HUM consist almost entirely of Pakistani and Afghan 
nationals, with many of the Afghans coming from the Nuristan area 
of Eastern Afghanistan. They also have a small number of Arab 
mercenaries of Afghan war vintage. 
The HM has a large percentage of Kashmiris recruited 
on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). The Deobandi-Wahabi 
extremist influence is the strongest on the HUM, moderate on the 
HM and weak on the Al Badr. The HUM, almost entirely, and the HM, 
partly, recruit their volunteers from the religious madrasas of Pakistan. 
The HUM is a member of Osama bin Laden's International 
Islamic Front For Jihad Against the US and Israel, whereas the HM is 
not. While the HUM has close relations with the Taliban, which has 
allowed them to run their training camps in its territory, those of the 
HM have been strained because of its continuing support to Gulbuddin 
Heckmatyar of the Hizbe Islami. As a result, it does not have any 
training camps in Afghan territory. After breaking with the HM, the Al 
Badr has been trying to mend its relations with the Taliban. 
Despite these differences, these organisations co-
operate at the ground level in Kashmir. 
Before the coup Mr. Nawaz Sharif, partly under US 
pressure and partly due to his own concern over their activities, had 
ordered the ISI to round up the cadres of these organisations and 
there were indications that he was planning to ban the Lashkar and 
the HUM. 
After the coup. Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Chief 
Executive, released all the arrested cadres and has resisted US 
pressure to ban them. For the sake of our study, we have divided the 
terrorist organisations in Kashmir under four categories. 
This study comprises of six chapters, the first chapter 
deals with the conceptual framework of terrorism, of how the definition 
of terrorism has been changing over the years and of how diffucit it is 
to find a universally acceptable definition of terrorism. It covers the 
various typologies of terrorism. It talks about the identity issues, issues 
of governance, different theories put forward by various scholars. In 
this chapter the role of the state as a sponsoror or a protector of 
terrorism is also looked into. 
Kashmir has always boasted of a rich culture of a 
coexistence of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. Since terrorist 
movements engage in cultural reinterpretation of identity groups and 
communities, the historical background and cultural understanding 
are imperative for analysing the rise of militancy in these two states. 
Thus in chapter second, we, focus on Kashmiriyat as a composite 
identity as against their communal identity interpretations. 
it has been observed that in Kashmir, terrorism has not 
been the activity of a single individual. There has always been a group 
the size and structure of which may vary which has been behind the 
terrorist's act. Terrorism is a group activity. The group can not work 
alone. It needs money, arms and other material support to function. 
In chapter three first an introduction is given of these different groups 
and then a detailed study is made of Hizbul Muzahideen or HM. This 
is one of the largest terrorist organisations operating in Jammu and 
Kashmir with a cadre base drawn from indigenous and foreign 
sources. It is the most important terrorist organisation in terms of its 
effectiveness in perpetrating violence across regular intervals. It is 
one of the 32 outfits which come under the Prevention of Terrorists 
Act 2002. 
The fourth chapter deals with Harkat-ul-Ansar. This 
organisation was formed by the merger of Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-lslami 
and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen both of which were Pakistani groups. This 
outfit strove to achieve secession of Jammu and Kashmir with the 
help of violent means and its eventual merger with Pakistan. About 
60 percent of its militants were Pakistanis and Afghans. This 
organisation was declared as a 'terrorist organisation' by the United 
States due to its association with Osama-bin-Laden in 1997 and 
thereafter it changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. In this chapter 
the role of U.S.A. has also been mentioned. 
As no study of Kashmir terrorism can be complete without 
mentioning the role of Pakistan in chapter five an endeavour has been 
made to analyse the role of Pakistan and its intelligence agency the 
ISI in promoting terrorism in Kashmir. 
The future course of terrorism in Kashmir is dif{L«w.lt to 
predict. This is a revolt that has been organised "yet" at times 
spontaneous on emotional issues. What is important is to establish 
the legitimacy of the state government in the eyes of the people along 
with launching a meaningful counter offensive against Pakistan's 
surrogate forces operating in Jammu and Kashmir. A high priority 
must be assigned to impro^ving economic conditions in the rural areas 
both in Jammu and kashmir regions. In the final analysis the people 
must be won over. 
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PREFACE 
Terrorism is assumed as a phenomena that can be analyzed in terms of the method s 
and effects of violence employed for political aims. The connotations of terrorism have been 
changing .If it began in modem times as Robespierre's reign of terror ,today there is cyber 
terrorism. This is a new form of terrorism that is now becoming prevalent. There are 
definitional, typological and ideological problems in understanding terrorism . The theories 
of social change are inadequate to understand it. Terrorism is understood in the terms of 
means and effect to achieve political goals. This can be used both by the opposition groups 
and by the state. Those who find definitions inadequate opt for typologies. Typologies are 
found wanting too. They suffer from ideological biases and prejudices. Some episodes defy 
any classification. 
Steering clear of definitional, typological and ideological dimensions of 
terrorism, an attempt has been made to look at terrorism as a strategy to achieve certain goals. 
This approach does not claim any advantage from general theories of revolt or violence. It 
looks at individual and organizational behavior in the context of structural factors. 
Many theories have been enunciated to deal with its causes in terms of 
alienation, social and economic factors and ideological linkages. This dissertation attempts to 
look at the individual and organizational aspect of tenorism. It assumes that the individual 
and the organization are intrinsically connected. In this it looks at the social, economic and 
historical conditions as preconditions and events as precipitants in the process of terrorism. 
We forego any gains fi«m a historico socio analysis .We only focus on the individual and 
organizational aspects of terrorism. 
Our assumption is that terrorists are not depraved or cold blooded calculators. 
They make rational choices. More significantly, they may also have a sensibility that may 
allow them to leave the earlier path and adopt a new one. Having seen the unintended results 
of their choice in terms of cost benefit analysis, they may want to give up that option and 
return to their real family. But the organizations of which they become members become 
their political families. Inter organisational conflict may exist there. The organizations have 
tiieir processes and ideologies, which may hinder the individuals to come out of them once 
they realize their mistakes, or strengthen their resolve and carry on. 
With this in mind, this thesis attempts to study terrorist organizations in Kashmir 
with special reference to the Harkat-ul-Ansar and Hizbul mujahideen. Also conceptualising it 
widi a comparative perspective of religion and history. Kashmir has always boasted of 
Kashmiriyat meaning compositeness and comingling- values that are now on a decline 
The choice of these two organizations was made not only because they had been very 
actively involved in increasing militancy in the states but also because they have a lot of 
support from other countries; Harkat -ul-Ansar has been declared a terrorist organization by 
the United States and has the blessings of Saudi billionaire Osama Bin Laden. The Hizbul 
Muzahideen is the militant wing of the Jamaat-e- islami ,a socio-cultural organization of 
Jammu and Kashmir . Both these organisations are funded by the ISI and are considered 
among the deadliest organisations operating in India. Harkat-Ul- Ansar has mostly foreign 
terrorists. Since 1996, practically all acts of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir have been 
carried out by the Lashkar, which is the militant wing of the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, the 
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), formerly known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar, which has been 
declared by the US as an international terrorist organisation since October, 1997, the HM, 
which is the militant wing of the Jamat-e-Islami of Kashmir, and the Al Badr, a splinter group 
of the HM. The HUM consist almost entirely of Pakistani and Afghan nationals, with many 
of the Afghans coming from the Nuristan area of Eastern Afghanistan. They also have a small 
number of Arab mercenaries of Afghan war vintage. 
The HM has a large percentage of Kashmiris recruited on both sides of the 
Line of Control (LoC). The Deobandi-Wahabi extremist influence is the strongest on the 
HUM, moderate on the HM and weak on the Al Badr, The HUM, almost entirely, and the 
HM, partly, recruhtheir volunteers from the religious madrasas of Pakistan. 
The HUM is a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front For 
Jihad Against the US and Israel, whereas the HM is not. While the HUM has close relations 
with the Taliban, which has allowed them to run their training camps in its territory, those of 
the HM have been strained because of its continuing support to Gulbuddin Heckmatyar of the 
Hizbe Islami. As a result, it does not have any training camps in Afghan territory. After 
breaking with the HM, the Al Badr has been trying to mend its relations with the Taliban. 
Despite these differences, these organisations co-operate at the ground level in 
Kashmir and Syed Salahuddin, the Amir of the HM, is the head of the 14-member United 
Jehad Council, based in MuzafTarabad in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). 
Before the coup on October 12 last year, Mr .Nawaz Sharif, partly under US 
pressure and partly due to his own concern over their activities, had ordered the ISI to round 
up the cadres of Aese organisations and there were indications that he was plaiming to ban 
the Lashkar and the HUM. 
After the coup, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Chief Executive, released all the 
arrested cadres and has resisted US pressure to ban them. On the contrary, he has allowed 
them to hold public rallies against India all. over Pakistan, without the display of arms, 
whereas under Mr.Sharif and Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, they were allowed to hold rallies only in 
their respective headquarters. 
This dissertation comprises of six chapters. The first chapter deals with 
conceptual frame work of terrorism. Terrorism has been defined in a number of ways by 
different scholars, In this chapter we briefly describe the history of terrorism, causes and 
typologies are used to explain the meaning and different perceptions of terrorism. 
The historical background & cultural understanding are imperative for 
analysing the rise of militancy in these two states . Terrorists are made. No one is a bom 
terrorist as also no one is a warmonger by birth. Kashmir has always boasted of a rich culture. 
Since terrorist movements engage in cultural reinterpretation of identity groups and 
communities ,we focus on Kashmiriyat as composite identity as against their communal 
identity interpretations. Chapter two deals with this aspect. 
It has been observed that terrorism in the above state has not been the activity 
of a single individual. There has always been a group - the size and structure of which might 
vary- which has been behind the terrorist act. Terrorism is a group activity.. The group does 
not work in isolation. It always has some connection outside itself. It can not work alone. 
Among other things, it needs money, arms and other material support to function. Very 
often, these groups have the support of other countries. Chapter three and four analyse these 
different groups. As the number of terrorist groups is too large, first there is a brief mention, 
about some well known organizations and then these two organizations are discussed in 
detail. An attempt has been made to describe the command structure, the recruitment process, 
the financial aspect, the age-group, the education level , the ideological strength, the inter 
and intra group dependence and conflict and the relations across the border. Chapter five 
focuses on the role of Pakistan hence showing the role of state sponsored terrorism 
In the concluding part, an attempt has been made to compare the two 
organizations structures. Number of interviews of police, army officers and of some terrorists 
were also conducted. These interviews were conducted in an infomal and unstructured 
manner. The findings of these interviews hive been included in the dissertation though 
wherever necessary, anonymity has been maintained. 
This dissertation is based on governments reports, interview with police and 
army officers and terrorists, intelligence reports and also secondary sources. 
In the appendices, the profiles of certain significant terrorist leaders is drawn 
to show the difficulty which they face as individuals when they attempt to leave the 
organizations. This is based on secondary as well as primary sources. 
I take this opportunity to thank Dr. Asmer Beg who is the guiding spirit 
behind this woiio A truly dedicated guide, friend and philosopher, he painstakingly and 
tirelessly went dirough the entire work several times. His drive and quest for excellence 
remain unparalleled. 
The endearing support of my family has been a great help in accomplishing 
my task. 
I would also like to thank the staff of Aligarh Muslim University Library 
Aligarh ,Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, New Delhi, Institute of Defence Studies and 
Analysis Library, New Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, Library of 
Police Headquarters, Jaipur, J. P. Library, Meerut, Library of D. A. V. College, Ajmer, 
National Police Academy Library, Hyderabad and the Library of Lai Bahdur Shastri National 
Academy of Administration, Mussorie. I am thankful to all those interviewees who consented 
to talk to me. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF TERRORISM 
Terms like" terrorism" and "reign of terror" have changed meaning several 
times . Originally , in the " popular phase" of the French revolution the terms stood for 
organised intimidation by the ruling factions and not by the revolutionary sections of the 
masses. Two centuries of uprisings .revolutions, rebellions ,and world wars later, terrorism 
has become the weapon of tiie weak. Those who seek to change their worid , but cannot 
muster the power to do so . At the dawn of the 21st century, terrorist violence does not have 
to be actual; even threats can create fear. 
Today's terrorist are empowered disproportionately by the transport and 
telecommunication revolution,s and the tools of globalisations such as electronic banking 
and internet. Smuggling, drug or gun-running and money laundering are replacing robberies 
as fund raising options . Ideologically divergent outfits in different parts of the globe are 
even joining hands. 
The modem state , in its strategic responses , has also become much more 
effective and focussed. Many policy makers in democratic system are tempted to use 
repression, but it has been proved conclusively that this creates the vicious circle of terror 
and counter-terror. Nations faced with terrorism evolve their own strategic culture as an 
outcome of the state 's repetitive (planned and coincidental) responses to incidents of 
violence . They try to make tight securities a part of their national ethos and constantly 
research and develop method of combating terrorism . Security forces try to learn lessons 
from the bitter experiences. 
Terror has been with man since Adam and Eve were driven out of Eden. Man has 
fears, phobias, apprehensions and alarms in varying degrees and these have been utilized by 
prophets and saints, tyrants and the champions of proletariat to elicit desired responses-
trying to make him God fearing or a subordinate creature. Terrorism derived from terror 
(intense fear) and ism (practise of or theory or principles thereof) is a word about which, no 
two people seem to agree, either to what it means or the appropriate response. 
According to Martha Crenshaw', both the phenomenon of terrorism and our 
conception of it depend on historical context -political, social and economic - and on how the 
groups and individuals, who participate in or respond to the actions we call terrorism, relate 
to the world in which they act. 
The term terrorism and terrorist are of relatively recent date. The meaning of 
terrorism was given in the 1798 supplement of the dictionnaire of the academic franchise as 
"systeme de la terror". According to a French dictionary published in 1796, the Jacobians had 
on occasions used the term when speaking about themselves in a positive sense^.- Only later 
did it become a term of abuse with criminal implications. 
It did not take long for the term to reach England. Edmund Burke in 1795 
wrote about "thousands of those hell hounds called terrorists, who were let loose on the 
people."Terrorism during the French revolutiqn was more or less a synonym for a reign of 
terror. A terrorist was anyone who attempted to further his views by a system of coercive 
intimidation. During Burke's time attack on property caused terror. Today in the context of 
hijacking of IC-814, attack on life causes terror. Obviously, the meaning of the word has 
undergone changes since the times of Thomas Hobbes who created a 'Leviathan' to prevent 
fear from gripping man desirous of commodious living. 
No definition of terrorism can possibly cover all varieties of terrorism that 
have appeared over history. In the ninteenth century. People's Will Group practised the tactic 
against the Czar in defence of democracy. Peasant wars, labour disputes and brigandage have 
been accompanied by systematic and sporadic terror, and the same is true of general 
wars,civil wars,revolutionary wars and resistance movements against foreign occupants. They 
need to be distiguished from terror politics. Terrorist activities have been and are contextual 
in time and space. However in most cases terrorism was one of the strategies to achieve ends, 
or, some movements developed a fringe that was labelled terroristic. 
One of the earliest known examples of a terrorist movement is the Sicari- a 
highly organized religious sect consisting of men of lower orders active in zealot struggle in 
Palestine in A.D.66-73. A similar mixture of messianic hope and political terrorism was the 
feature of another group-tiie Assasins. They were an offshoot of the Ismailis who appeared in 
Persia in the 11th century and were suppressed by the Mongols only in the 13th century. 
Their style is akin to contemporary terrorism. . 
Secret societies of a different kind existed for centuries in India and the Far 
East. Anglo-Indian authorities denied the existence of thuggis until Captain William Sleeman 
studied and fmally destroyed them. Thuggis did not have a political intent. The ideology of 
Indian terrorism was a curious mix of Indian tradition and western influences. 
Secret societies in China existed among river pirates and the outlaws both in the hills 
and among city dwellers. There is hardly any society -ancient or modem -that does not show 
the signs of terrorist activities-sporadic or more organised, non-political or political, social 
protest or criminal. Thus the origin of terrorism is of an ancient vintage and so cannot belong 
to the terrain of either National Liberation Theology or Marxism, as has been made out 
traditionally. 
Terrorism has been defmed in various ways by different scholars. Bell argues 
that terrorism is the weapon of the weak but it is a very powerful weapon. Bell's description 
treats terrorism as a conflictual behaviour by those for whom full scale military conflict is 
impractical. Fromkin takes a similar approach in arguing that military action is aimed at 
physical destruction while terrorism aims at psychological consequences. Terrorism, he 
argues is violence for the purpose of creating fear. Jenkins views terrorism as a low cost type 
of warfare between major powers.^ 
From a conservative point of view, Walter Lacquer's work is good. His and 
Brian Jenkins view is typical of US State department's point of view. According to Walter 
Lacquer of Georgetown University, violence or threatened violence intended to produce 
change is terrorism-^ This sentence shows that both think that terrorism is (1) illegitimate 
force (2) applied on iimocent people (3) for illegitimate ends. The official defmition of 
terrorism accepted by both Germany and US is" criminal violence violating legal codes and 
punishable by the state is terrorism. This definition which looks at terrorism as a crime 
metaphor was provided by the US Senate and so it just takes the state view of terrorism. But 
terrorism has otfier roots and causes as well which the defmition does not talk of 
Rubenstein^ takes the position that terrorists are communicators who have lost faith not in the 
message but the ability to move the audience using non-violent language. Hamilton^ defmes 
terrorism as violence with four distinguishing characteristics. It is planned, has a political 
purpose, is directed against the state or other established power and is conducted by a small 
group. Kirk describes terrorism as "political extortion". 
Raymond Aron^ describes terrorists act of violence as one whose aim is to 
have a psychological effect out of proportion to its purely physical result. 
Ronald Crelinstein° defmes • it as a particular strategy of political 
communication. It utilizes a combination of violence and the threat of violence. 
Ted Gurr^ calls terrorism a state of mind of political actors who are paralyzed 
by tfie threat of unpredictable attack. Yonah Alexander defines terrorism as - "The use or 
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threat of use of violence against random or civilian targets in order to intimidate or to create 
generalised pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals". 
TYPOLOGY 
As definitions are not inclusive of all the aspects of terrorism, other analysts 
have come out with typologies to overcome this problem. Some of the main typologies are:-
Typology made by Paul Wilkinson. 
Three types of terror emerge from his analysis (1) Criminal (2) Political (3) State 
sponsored. 
He also makes a distinction between internal and external terrorism. 
purpose: 
J Bower Bell*' describes six basic types of terrorism and their corresponding 
Type Purpose 
Psychotic Psychological gratification 
Criminal Profit 
Vigilante Retaliation 
Endemic Internal struggle 
Authorized State repression 
Revolutionary Behavioural change through fear. 
These are further subdivided into 
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(a) Organisational - To maintain discipline. 
(b) Allegiance - To win public support. 
(c) Functional - To accomplish goals and functions of groups. 
(d) Provocative - Aim is to incite governments to repression. 
(e) Manipulative - Aim is to strike at targets for psychological impact. 
(f) Symbolic - Aim is to strike at targets for psychological impact. 
British expert Crozier does group classification which also is six fold. 
(1) These are minority nationalistic groups composed of ethnic factions who wish to 
replace the powers that be. 
(2) Marxist revolutionary groups. 
(3) Anarchist groups composed of revolutionaries who seek to destroy the social order. 
(4) Pathological groups or individuals similar to the anarchist. 
(5) Neo Fascist groups or individuals of the right wing. 
(6) Ideological mercenaries like the Japanese red army. 
These typologies provide an approach to the tactics of terrorists, thus 
suggesting five tactical forms of terrorism. 
(1) Criminal 
(2) Ideological 
(3) Nationalistic 
(4) State sponsored 
(5) Guerilla 
12 
There are six tactics of terrorism as mentioned by Brian Jenkins. ^ ^ These are : 
(1) Bombing 
(2) Kidnapping 
(3) Arson 
(4) Hijacking 
(5) Ambush 
(6) Hostage Takmg. 
STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM 
State terrorism which is sponsored by the state and state sponsored terrorism -
terrorism which is sponsored by another country are two very prevalent forms of terrorism. 
Gupta'^ in his article writes that in the conditions of nuclear weapons and its 
potential of human annihilation, potential of causing ecological disasters and the 
unwiimability of nuclear war under modem conditions, unconventional, unpositional war is 
increasingly been resorted to. The aim is to create conditions of political instability, violence 
and insecurity at the internal level of the target state so as to serve the strategic interests of the 
sponsoring nations. Usually in the Third World countries the issues of poverty alleviation, 
technological advancement have combined with the limited percolation effects of the 
developmental strategies, and acquisitive politics. Combined with these are the old, often 
passive cleavages on ethnic grounds. The states for their strategic interests fan the old and the 
new cleavages into violent expressions of insurgency, counter insurgency and terrorism that 
is related to small group violence. The significant variable is outside help. On its own the 
internal factors do not lead to terrorism, or, terrorism for that matter. This kind of violence is 
designated as Low Intensity Conflict. LIC is the fiery medium of racial, tribal, religious and 
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regional struggles manifesting in wars short of their declaration i.e. undeclared confrontation. 
Afsir Karim'^ describes Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir as such an 
unconventional war. In the context of Pakistan sponsoring terrorism in India, we may agree 
with Gupta^^ who writes" we may therefore conclude here that terrorism is a method against 
liberal democracy and that it is an unconventional warfare against power and dominant value 
system. In this, it is not to be equated with either a National Liberation Movement or with 
Revolutionary Warfare." 
Martha Crenshaw'* talks about the difference between precipitants and 
preconditions. Preconditions are factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, and 
precipitants are specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. A 
further classification divides preconditions into enabling or permissive factors, which 
provide opportunities for terrorism to occur, and situations that directly inspire and motivate 
terrorist campaigns. Precipitants are similar to the direct causes of terrorism. Furthermore, no 
factor is neatly compartmentalized in a single nation-state; each has a transnational 
dimension that complicates the analysis. 
First, modernization produces an interrelated set of factors that is a significant 
permissive cause of terrorism, as increased complexity on all levels of society and economy 
creates opportunities and vubierabilities Sophisticated networks of transportation and 
communication offer mobility and the means of publicity for terrorists. 
Urbanization is part of the modem trend towards aggregation and complexity, which 
increases the accessibility of targets and methods. Social 
"facilitation", which Gurr found to be extremely powerfiil in bringing about civil strife in 
general, is also an important permissive factor. This concept refers to social habits and 
historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the government making it 
VRoraiV;/ and poU\\ca\ty 3^^^^^*'^ '^  ^ '^ ^^^"^ dkteAmg an appropriate form, soth as 
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demonstrations, coups, or terrorism. Social myths, traditions and habits permit the 
development of terrorism as an established political custom. Moreover, broad attitudes and 
beliefs that condone terrorism are communicated transnationally. Revolutionary ideologies 
have always crossed borders with ease, as did the ideology of French Revolution. 
IDENTrrY ISSUE: RELIGION, CULTURE AND COMMUNALISM 
Martha Crenshaw is of the opinion that the first condition that can be 
considered a direct cause of terrorism is the concrete grievances among an identifiable 
subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the 
majority. A social movement develops in order to redress these grievances and to gain either 
equal rights or a separate state; terrorism is then the resort of an extremist faction of this 
broader group which provide opportunities for terrorism to occur, and situations that directly 
inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns. Precipitants are similar to the direct causes of 
terrorism. Furthermore , no factor is neatly compartmentalized in a single nation-state; each 
has a transnational dimension that complicates the analysis. 
First, modernization produces an interrelated set of factors that is a significant 
permissive cause of terrorism, as increased complexity on all levels of society and economy 
creates opportunities and vulnerabilities Sophisticated networks of transportation and 
communication offer mobility and the means of publicity for terrorists. 
Urbanization is part of the modem trend towards aggregation and complexity, which 
increases the accessibility of targets and methods. Social 
"facilitation", which Gurr found to be extremely powerful in bringing about civil strife in 
general, is also an important permissive factor. This concept refers to social habits and 
historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the government making it 
morally and politically justifiable and even dictating an appropriate form, such as 
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demonstrations,coups, or terrorism. Social myths, traditions and habits permit the 
development of terrorism as an established political custom. Moreover, broad attitudes and 
beliefs that condone terrorism are communicated transnationally. Revolutionary ideologies 
have always crossed borders with ease, as did the ideology of French Revolution. 
IDENTITY ISSUE: RELIGION, CULTURE AND COMMUNALISM 
Martha Crenshaw is of the opinion that the first condition that can be 
considered a direct cause of terrorism is the concrete grievances among an identifiable 
subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the 
majority. A social movement develops in order to redress these grievances and to gain either 
equal rights or a separate state; terrorism is then the resort of an extremist faction of this 
broadermovement. On Punjab and the Sikhs, Paul Wallace writes, "What is more important to 
the Punjab problem is the religious identity of the Sikhs and their ethnic identities as 
Punjabis." There is a whole body of literature that takes the view that there is no terrorism in 
Kashmir and the North-East. It is regarded purely as a struggle for self determination through 
armed politics in the name of the people and by the people. 
ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE 
Indian writings and writings on India focus on two dimensions of causality of 
terrorism viz external and internal. In the internal they refer to mainly two factors viz., 
problem of governance and the role of religion. 
Within tfie broad streams of interpretation in India, perceptions of these 
conflicts refer to a range of super-structural factors, including demography (Northeast), 
ideology and politics (J&K, Punjab and the Northeast). The terrorist challenge is to 
the so-far-dominant secular and political nationalism, as well as to the original 
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amiability of religious persuasions. A sampling of some of the various patterns of 
commentary is given below: 
"Terrorism elevates politics to the level ofquasi-religious movements".^0 
"The growth of Muslim fundamentalism in Kashmir has unfortunately been more by 
default".2l 
"Hie contemporary Kashmir Problem dating from 1988-89 contains a volatile mix 
of self determination (including national Self determination) and Islamic 
fundamcntalism".22 
"The very essence of the Pandit is a challenge to atttempt a total Islamisation of the 
valley and reversal of its cultural traditions that are fundamentally Hindu in 
essence" .^ '^  
"Launched in the early 1980s by a group of bigots who discovered their justification in 
a perversion of the Sikh religious identity, and supported by a gaggle of political 
opportunists both within the country and- aborad, this movement had consumed 21, 469 
lives before it was comprehensively defeated in 1993.."^^ 
"The fear that the immigrant population- the outsiders- would one day dominate 
them is keeping most of secessionist movements alive in the Northeast."^^ 
"Religious and ethnic cleavages created by the activities of various political groups 
have further aggravated the internal stability situation"^^ 
Common to all these writings is a nuanced appaisal of the external linkages of 
this politics and its roots in bad govem^ce.Invariably all accounts of the political 
process,especially the politics of vote banks. The view that terrorism is high voltage party 
politics has found its expression in comments on the activities of the RSS - the cultural wing 
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of BJP, the Akali Party, the Congress, the National Conference, the Naxalites and regional 
parties. Over the decades, the party system in India has shifted from one dominant party to 
coalition party governments at the Centre, and to a multi-party system from a two-party 
system in the States. Terrorism in India took roots after 1967, but especially after 1971. These 
two dates are related to the emergence of the coalition governments in the States and the 
crisis of the Congress government at the Center, and to India's victory against Pakistan, 
respectively. The continuous erosion of the Centrist political system, accompanied by the 
gradual escalation of terrorism, is in conformity with Leonard Weinberg's thesis that the 
proliferation of parties leads to the phenomenon of terrorist politics. The role of political 
parties and existing power elites in these circumstances has been observed in virtually every 
theatre of terrorist strife in India27. 
In Punjab, according to K.P.S Gill, "TTie Sikh religious leadership - and 
prominently among them the Alkalis... picked up the ftmdamentalist card; moreover, it was 
this leadership that either participated in, encouraged, or failed to oppose or, dissociate itself, 
from the campaign of terror for Khalistan"^^. 
In Kashmir, "Barring a solitary exception of the 1977 Assembly elections, 
rigging punctuated every election in the State, particularly the Valley. However, in 1987, 
ftmdamentalists got an opportunity on a platter to whip up anti-India fellings. Had the 1987 
elections been fair, the secessionists would have invented another reason to advance their 
nefarious designs. But the people surmised that Rajiv Gandhi and Dr. Farooq deliberately 
took away their right to vote and betrayed them by massive rigging. The MUF came in for 
favourable mention in every home, in every office and in every lane and by-lane of Kashmir. 
People began to perceive bad administration, rigged elections, etc., as a consequence of 
Kashmir's accession to India" ^ 9. 
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Briefly, the logic is that the political process and the formulation and 
implementation of policy added to the crisis in qualitative terms. Most of these analyses treat 
the administrative dimension of the problem in a manner that blames the government of the 
day, even as they blame them for treating the problem of terrorism purely as a law and order 
problem or a problem related to' development. Marwah expresses this position succinctly in 
tiie context of the Punjab militancy, "The government treated terrorism merely as a law and 
order problem. The solution to terrorism, as the policy makers in New Delhi wrongly 
believed, did not lie in taking over the administration directly by New Delhi.... This mistake 
was repeated by the V.P. Singji's government in 1990 when it left Farooq Abdullah with no 
option but to resign by qipointing Jagmohan as the governor of Jammu and Kashmir"^^. 
Marwah's criticism, however, extends well beyond the political executive, and is directed 
equally at various' security experts' who endorse a reductionist apporach to the terrorism. "It 
is not the political leaders alone who fail to grasp this essential fact and the complex nature of 
the problem" 31. 
The most salient political factor in the category of permissive cause is a 
government's inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism. The absence of adequate 
prevention by police and intelligence services permits the spread of conspiracy. However, 
since terrorist organizations are small and clandestine, the majority of states can be placed in 
die permissive category. Gupta^^ writes that it is the soft state argument as propounded by 
Gunnar Myrdal as also its strong arm tactics that are regarded to be the cause of terrorism. 
The soft state argument accoimts for both the internal and the external dimensions. It is 
argued that India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 shook the faith of the common man in 
the North, East, in the edacity of India to secure them. When examined a little more closely, 
it amoimts to what AtuI Kohli says that India is in a bad shape .This theory is opposed by 
Paul Wallace^^ who calls it a "rising power". 
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Crenshaw believes that the existence of a dissatisfied minority or majority 
is not a necessary or sufficient cause of terrorism, nor does terrorism always reflect objective 
social or economic deprivation. It is the perceived injustice underlying the deprivation that 
give rise to anger or finstration. The intervening variables lie in the terrorist's perceptions. 
Moreover, it seems likely that for terrorism to occur the govertunent must be singled out to 
blame for popular suffering. In his article Gupta^ '* quotes John Bary who says that in India 
and Indonesia "religious fervor and economic deprivation...made a highly combustible 
mixture which is certain to produce more explosions". Gupta goes on to say that for Punjab 
and Jammu and Kashmir , the thesis of internal colonialism cannot be applied. It may 
perh^s be useful to look at the reverse thesis, i.e., Punjab perceives its prosperity as the 
basis for looking for more .In Janrniu and Kashmir, it has been conceded that while the state 
received privileged treatment it is the intervening political element which caused alienation. 
Arjun Ray agrees that militancy in Kashmir is a problem of scarcity and coercion though 
not religion. The psychoanalysis of 400 captured militants concludes that they took the gun 
because of the following compulsions: Coercion - 45% , Economic Deprivation and deep 
sense of hurt (alienation) - 45.5% , Religion - 10%". How does one analyse a feeling of 
hurt? It is difficult to quantify. Psychologists do not have definitive answers. 
Another condition that creates motivation for terrorism is the lack of 
opportunity for political participation. Regimes that deny access to power and persecute 
dissenters create dissatisfaction. In this case grievances are primarily political, without social 
or economic overtones .Discrimination is not directed against any ethnic ,religious, or racial 
subgroup of the population. The terrorist organisation is not necessarily part of a broader 
social movement; indeed, the population may be largely apathetic. In situations where paths 
to the legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the regime's repression is 
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inefficient, revolutionary terrorism is doubly likely, as permissive and direct causes coincide. 
It is here that the liberal democracies have their Achille's heels. 
Leonard Weinberg^views terrorism as high intensity party politics. According 
to him , there are variety of ways in which political parties and political terrorism intersect. 
The most clear cut situation is one in which the party as an organization pursues its goals 
through terrorist violence. And, as with other types of party -related violence, the party 
involved may use terrorism on a continuing basis or intermittently as the perceived need for it 
arises. Secondly, just as parties may use terrorism, so too terrorist groups can make use of 
party politics. That is, violent political organisations may find it advantageous to form 
'political wings' to pursue their goals, at least in part, through the electoral process. Weinberg 
says tfiat political parties are susceptible to factionalism. In many instances, if factional 
conflict within the party becomes severe enough, dissidents will exit the organization in order 
to form another party. While this is a common pattern, there is another and not altogether 
unusual path. Dissidents may come to regard the electoral arena as hopeless, for one reason 
or another, and decide to form not a new party but a terrorist organisation as the means to 
achieve their objectives. 
Weinberg believes that independent parties created out of dissident factions of 
previously existing and larger parties may continue to try to influence the latter's behaviour, 
to move it in a direction the dissidents fmd desirable. The same applies where the dissidents 
have formed not a new party but a terrorist group. 
But Martha Crenshaw believes that terrorism is essentially the result of elite 
dissatisfaction; it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider 
popular constituency who have not been consulted about, and do not necesseirily approve of, 
the terrorists' aims or methods. Many terrorists today are young, well educated, and middle 
class in background. Such students or young professionals, with prior political experience. 
21 
are disillusioned with the prospects of changing society and see little chance of access to the 
system despite their privileged status. 
Crenshaw is of the view that terrorism is most likely to occur where mass 
passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Discontent is not generalized or severe enough to 
provoke the majority of the populace to action against the reginie, yet a small minority, 
without access to the base of power would permit overthrow of the government through coup 
d' etat or subversion, seeks radical change. Terrorism may thus be a sign of stable society 
rather than a symptom of fragility and collapse. 
Although it is generally thought that precipitants are the most unpredictable of 
causes, there does seem to be a common pattern of government actions that act as catalysts 
for terrorism. Crenshaw continues by saying that Government's use of unexpected and 
imusual force in response to protest or reform attempts often compels terrorist retaliation. The 
development of such an action -reaction syndrome then establishes the structure of the 
conflict between the regime and its challengers. So, according to Crenshaw, we must look at 
terrorist organization's perception and interpretation of the situation. Terrorists view the 
context as permissive making terrorism a viable option . In a material sense, the means are 
placed at their disposal by the environment. Circumstances also provide the terrorists with 
compelling reasons for seeking political change .Finally, an event occurs that snaps the 
terrorists' patience with the regime .Government action is now seen as intolerably unjust and 
terrorism becomes not only a possible decision but a morally acceptable one. The regime has 
for feited its status as the standard of legitimacy. For the terrorist, the end may now excuse 
the means. 
Gupta" is of the view that it is not merely political alienation and distortions of 
the electoral process that are the causes of terrorism, if at all. Frustrations with the working of 
the political system may lead to insurgency as in the North - East. Further, in Kashmir, apart 
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from a strong sentiment for autonomy, it is the failure of opposition parties to grow that may 
have led to the growth of frustration with the system- a system that was being continuously 
manipulated by the local administrative elite leading to corruption and the incapacity of the 
system to give accurate information to the all- India leadership, who had their own interests 
which clouded the rational focus on National Security concerns. The step from being a party 
agitator to a terrorist is a small but significant one. 
According to Oots'* another type of good, motivating the terrorist could be 
'select incentives', These m ^ be either economic or solidary. Selective incentives are goods 
which are available only to members of the organized group which seek a public good, i.e., 
the terrorist organisations members. Group solidarity and financial gains from terrorist acts 
are examples of selective incentives for terrorists. Some of the motives as listed by Oots are -
Terrorism may be committed for publicity. It may be committed in order to undermine 
authority. It may be the result of a need to express frustration. It may be committed in order 
to free jailed colleagues. It may be motivated by a need for fmancial resources to fund 
terrorist operations. Terrorism may be a therapeutic act for the terrorist. It may be motivated 
by a desire to provoke repression. Punishment of enemies is another reason for terrorism. 
Terrorism may be used to create disorder in the society. Terrorism may be a substitute for 
full- scale warfare. Financial gain may motivate terrorism. It may result from a lack of other 
means for addressing grievances. Terrorism may be a rational choice activity under the given 
conditions. Collective or personal guilt can motivate the terrorist. It may be used to 
demonstrate the group's ability to act. Terrorism may be used to recruit new members for the 
group. 
Arjun Ray'' talks about the psychological causes. He says that in informal but 
structured discussions c^tured militants exhib.it well known traits of insecurity buttressed by 
high levels of pathological anxiety. The potential militant is trapped in a mental crossfire- the 
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fear of two guns - one in the hand of security forces and the other held by active militants. 
The psychological dilenuna intensifies till it becomes intolerable to live in the present. A low 
self esteem ,a weak ego and low frustration tolerance make matters worse.Sooner or later the 
die is cast; the devil wins. To the new convert, the elder militants are now his kindred , his 
religion, his hopes. When eveiything is lost, hope still lives on , and therefore the choice is 
quite clear. He makes up his mind. He crosses the Rubicon. Aijun Ray goes on to say that on 
account of the terrorist's pronounced psycho-social wound(some real, some imaginary), 
militants have a strong tendency to externalise - to blame society and 'others' for dieir 
inadequacies, for their plight in imprisonment. Those who are ideologues like Ahsan Dar, 
Inqualabi, and Harkat leaders like Abu Jindal of Charar -e- Sharif fame, suffer from acute 
symptoms of "exj^gerated s6lf- absorption" approaching Narcissism. Megalomaniac 
syndrome and misplaced sense of history is also evident. These ideologues still fantasise 
themselves as cast in the mould of Mao Tse tung and Che Guevra, striding larger than life 
across the stage of Kashmiri history. 
Thus their have been a number of motives that have been postulated for 
terrorism .The terrorist views terrorism as the best way to achieve these goals and 
motives.That is ,in the words of Oots, they seek to maximize utility which results from the 
attainment of any goal, insofar as it is possible under the given conditions. 
ORGANISATIONAL ASPECT: 
Three factors are very important in discussing the organisational aspect. 
(a) Alienation from social movement 
(b) Existence of a feeling of betrayal, frustration and the felt need to do something in a 
society that is transiting from tradition to modernity with capitalism as the vehicle. The 
latter lets loose old societies and moral bonds. The individual becomes atomistic struggling to 
cling to the old change in accordance with the new. 
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In this situation sociologists have talked of a need of Organisations. Weber's 
rational legal authority introduces rationality to anarchy of society. Durkheim's solidarity 
groups create religious and other solidarities Pluralists talk of associations as pressure groups 
that lead to consensual politics. Roussseau's Gmeral Will is formed through collective 
organisation rejecting partial wills. In the present also the minorities which may be cultural, 
religious, regional or lingiustic develop a feeling of alienation. Thus this leads to the 
formation of organisations. Anarchy in all processes leads the organisations to fight it. In the 
end, the alienated individuals organise themselves and become a terrorist organisation. New 
social movements try to remove the perceived injustices but terrorists do not agree. They 
need an organisation to fight terrorism. As in the present society so in India,one discovers 
that certain alienated individuals who are unable to come to power through the political 
process use terrorists route. They have specific socio - economic background. This suggests 
that the leadership is hetrogenous. Some come from absolutely deprived backgrounds while 
some are a bit better off. It is Hierefore essential to look at leadership patterns . Political 
scientists created in twentieth century, the argument for group identity. According to Oots"' 
group size may affect policy in several ways. At the operational level, group size is likely to 
influence the course of bargaining in negotiated terrorist acts. Intutively, it is apparent that the 
larger the terrorist group, the more likely there is to be a variety of opinion within the group. 
Policymakers also must account for overall organizational size when attempting to 
understand specific groups operating within a given jurisdiction. Terrorist organizations that 
are capable of fielding a large acting group have a larger choice of tactics than those who 
can gather only a sniall acting group. Moreover knowing a group's characteristic acting force 
size may give clues as to its likely choice of tactics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPOSITE CULTURE - KASHMIRIYAT 
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In Kashmir, there has always been a coexistence of Hinduism (Vaish 
and Shaivism) .Buddhism and Islam (Sufism).This composite culture became a model of 
Indian secularism. Co-existence and co- operation between different sects, different religions 
has been there for a long time now. Under Avantivamam, Hinduism flourished. Buddhism 
and Islam entered the valley peacefully. Thus Kashmiri culture has always stood for a 
peaceful co-existence among different religions.This chapter briefly describes the history of 
Kashmir to emphasise the point that there has always been an intermingling of different 
cultures ,of different religions in Kashmir. Thus making the people tolerant and respectful 
towards other religions.This is the crux of Kashmiriyat. 
Kashmir known as kasmira' to the local people was once a vast span of water 
according to certain geological and mythological beliefs. In one of the legends of Nilmata 
purana, the valleys name was 'satidesa.' The most reliable and the main source of ancient 
Kashmir's history is 'Kalhanas' epic historical poem Rajtarangini .^ Gonanda I the first known 
king of Kashmir was also a relative and a friend of Jarasandha who was the king of Magadha 
and the father in law of Krishna. He was killed when he went to help Jarasandha .Damodara 
who was Jarasandha's son become the king but he too was killed when he tried to fight 
Krishna. His widow who was pregnant ascended the throne. Her son was named Gonanda II 
and was crowned as the king. After him at least 43 weak and insignificant kings ruled 
Kashmir. It was in 273-232 B.C that Ashoka extended his rule over the valley and spread 
Buddhism. Thus Mauryan Empire began to decay after his death. His son Jalauka destroyed a 
few Buddhist Viharas and build two new Siva temples. Three centuries later, Kashmir passed 
under the control of the Kushans. Amongst the known Kushan rulers were Kanishka, Huska 
and Juska. The fourth buddhist council was held by Kanishka in Kashmir. Buddhism became 
the state religion. A close cultural affinity developed between Kashmir and North India which 
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was visible by the fact that numerous local leaders who succeeded the Kushans like 
Abhimanyu, Vibhisana I, Ravana, Vibhisana II were familiar names in North India. During 
their reign, Saivism prospered and Buddhism suffered. The Huns rule started with Mihira -
Kula who was a very cruel king but the local leaders soon regained power and the second 
Gonanda dynasty came into being, When Hieun Tsang came to India, the Karkota dynasty 
was ruling over Kashmir and its founder Durlabhawardhana was the king. He had influence 
over places as far as Taxila, Hazara, Poonch and Rajourie but he was not totally independent. 
The economy of Kashmir was in good shape. Emperor Harshvardhana whose capital was 
Kannaunj, exercised a weak form of suzerainty over Kashmir. The most outstanding king of 
the Karkota dynasty was Lalitaditya who ruled for 37 years. Due to the misrule of his 
successors, the dynasty collapsed by the middle of the ninth century. In the next one and a 
half century the history of Kashmir was influenud by the looks and disposition of two women 
one Jayadevi who gave a new dynasty Uptala under whose King Avantivaram, Kashmir 
prospered and Hindusim flourished and the Dther Didda who set in motion forces which 
ultimately led to the decline of Hindu rule in Kashmir. It was in an atmosphere of moral 
decay, economic decline and social and political disruption tfiat foreign adventurers started 
arriving in the valley. Two such foreigners were Shah Mir and Rinchana. The invasion by 
Dulacha, a Mongol warrior who hailed from Turkistan in 1320, struck a fatal blow to 
Kashmir. Dulacha swept everything before him. In the words of Jonaraja, Kashmir become 
almost like a region before creation, Rinchana who hailed form Ladakh, took advantage of 
the disorderly conditions and plundered the area arouind the Lar valley. He got Ram Chandra 
the chief minister who had declared himself as the king after the flight of Suhadeva in the 
wake of Dulacha'is invasion murdered by deceitful means and seized the throne. The kingdom 
of Kashmir thus came to be ruled by a Ladak Buddhist Rinchana married Kota Rani-the 
daughter of Ram Chandra. He restored order and set up an efficient administration under the 
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charge of Shah Mir. His proposal of becoming a Hindu was turned down by the Kashmir 
Brahmins and so he then embraced Islam. He assumed the name of Sultan Sadar-ud-Din. 
Thus Kashmir got its first muslim ruler which was shortlived as Rinchana died in 1332, 
leaving behind a minor son Haider. The courtiers invited Udyanadeva brother of late king 
Suhadeva to accept the tfirone which he did. He married Richana's widow Kota Rani to 
strengthen his position. After his death , Shah Mir became ruler. He adopted a humane, 
enlightened and just qsproach towards Hindus and Muslims alike. The most important Sultan 
was Shihab-ud-Din the grandson of Shah Mir. His rule was the most glorious epoch in the 
history of Muslim Sultanate in Kashmir. Islam thus made its way into Kashmir by gradual 
conversion and it was tiie influx of foreign adventurers from both the South and Central Asia 
which prepared tiie ground for this. Thus the fact that Islam came to Kashmir initially by 
peaceful rather than forced conversions is significant in its further history also. 
Shihab-ud-din's younger brother, Hindal succeeded him. It was during his time 
that Sayyed Ali Hamdani came to Kashmir and Islamic practices began to be adopted rather 
strictly. Under the next ruler Sultan Sikander, the Islamic zeal attained fanatical proportions. 
He came to be known as 'But Shikan' destroyer of idols. A relentless campaign for conversion 
to Islam was launched under the chief minister 'Saif-ud-Din*. His $on continued his policies 
but the next sultan Zain-ul- Abidin turned out to be the most tolerant and benevolent ruler 
that Kashmir has known. All restrictions against the Hindus were removed and he earned the 
reputation of being the greatest sultan of Kashmir who reined for half a century. His sons 
proved unworthy and the fortunes of the Sultan in Kashmir began to decline rapidly. The next 
120 years saw only mtrigues and conspiracies. It was in those unsetteled conditions that 
Mirza Haider Dughlat,a Mughal General who was in the service of Humayun entered the 
valley. In the name of Humayun, he ruled the valley for eleven years. His administration 
provided a welcome respite to the Kashmiris. After his death, there was scramble for power 
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among the local factions in which the Chaks emerged victorious. From the near anarchic 
condition which the Chaks had put it in, Kashmir was rescued by the Mughals who 
established their full control over.it in IS89 when emperor Akbar himself came there. Even 
before Akbar, the Mughals had been treating Kashmu* as part of the their empire, but in IS 89, 
Kahsmir became a province of the Mughal empire. It was ruled through a governor known as 
Subedar. Peace prevailed. Notable social refoms were carried by the Mughals. Akbar, 
Jehangir, Shah Jahan were all fascinated by Kashmir and visited it a number of times. During 
Aurangzeb's long rule of 49 years, Kashmir saw 14 governors most of whom ruled well 
except for Iftikar Khan who persecuted the Brahmins. After Aurangzeb's death as the Mughal 
empire started to crumble, the central authority over Kashmir was lost and the valley once 
again became a holbed of intrigues, violence and bloodshed. 
Akbar had been approached by some nobles and was requested to annex 
Kashmir. It was a good judgement as it brought peace and justice for about 120 years. Those 
who invited the Afghan ruler - Ahmad Shah Abdali did not realise that they were really 
calling a barbarous horde to their garden of nature. Sixty seven years of brutal Afghan rule 
caused untold miseries. It was the worst rule that Kashmiris had been subjected to. Birbal 
Dhar a Kashmiri nobleman £q)proached Maharaja Rajnit Singh for help and provided, him 
with valuable information about the streng^ and deployment of Jabbar Khan's forces With 
the sucessful conquest by Ranjit Singh, 67 years of Kashmirs' nightmare came to an end. 
"The Sikhs" as observed by Young Husband a British political resident "were not so 
barbarically cruel like the Afghans but they were hard and rough taskmasters." Their main 
objective was to collect the maximum amount of money, no matter what the long term 
consequences would be. Except for the brief period of Kirpa Ram's governorship, the Sikh 
rule in Kashmir which lasted for 27 years was far from being benign or just. While the 
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Hindus were treated slightly better, the Muslims were maltreated and subjected to a number 
of disabilities. 
In the various military campaigns undertaken by Ranjit Singh, Gulab Singh 
exhibited his unmatched skill, courage, loyatly and organisational ability. In recognition of 
Gulab Singh's services and as part of his overall strategy to create a subordinate military 
power between the Sikh and the Afghan domam, Ranjit Singh granted a number of estates 
including Jammu, to Gulab Singh. The title of Raja was conferred upon him and he was 
given the permission to raise his own force. The £)ogras thus acquired an important position 
in the Jammu region and also at Maharaja Ranjit Singh's court. As the British started 
strenghtening their hold, Gulab Singh cleverly turned the situation to his advantage. He 
remaind in secret touch, with the British while professing loyalty and friendliness to the 
Lahore durbar. In the power struggle which ensued for seven years after Ranjit Singh's death 
in 1839, Gulab Singh realistically accepted the position of subordinate alliance to the British 
and in the process secured a vast princely state free fix)m the vagaries of the Lahore Durbar. 
After the defeat of the Sikhs ,two separate treaties were signed. One was the treaty of Lahore 
between the Sikhs and the British government and the other was the treaty of Amritsar -
between Raja Gulab Singh and the British government, on March 16, 1846 which handed 
Kashmir and its adjoining areas over to Maharaja Gulab Singh for a mere sum of seventy five 
lakh rupees. The Dogra dynasty lasted for a little over a hundred years. This period saw four 
Maharajas- Gulab Singh, Ranbir Singh, Pratap Singh and Hari Singh. But the dynasty was 
always at the mercy of the British Government. With the Dogra dynasty started a new era of 
exploitation. The kingdom of Kashmir was now the largest princely state .Though the Dogra 
rulers sided with the British during the 1857 revolt still the British control over the state 
affairs was increased with the appointment of a Resident. It was the Dogra - British rule 
which finally set the Hindus and Muslims on a confrontationist path\ 
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An encouraging aspect of Kashmiriyat is that its compositeness and unity was 
the result of different castes and communities. Kashmiriyat instead of being a product of one 
religion is the result of composite convergence of sects and cults of Nagas, Shaivites, 
Vaishanavas, Buddhists, Sufis, Rishis. In spite of all the bigotry of some rulers, the spread of 
Islam too helped positively in the evolution of this culture. The tradition followed by 
Kashmiri Muslims, the indigenous method of practising their faith following the customs, to 
^e extent of modifying the rules of Islamic jurisprudence making them distinct from their co-
religionists elsewhere. Sunilarly the Hindus of Kashmir developed their over indigenous 
philosophies, devised their own symbols and created their own traditions, which distinguishes 
them from the preponderant majority of their coreligionists in the Sub Continef G.M.D. Sufi, 
observes, "the cult of Buddha, the mysticism of Islam have one after the other found a 
congenial home in Kashmir on account of its cultural homogeneity and geographical 
compactness. All who emigrated to Kashmir merged their individual identities into one^". 
On the eve of the country's independence, a number of forces were operating 
in the political paramoimt of the state because of which Kashmir soon found itself in the 
whirlpool of national and international controversy and conflict. Maharaja Hari Singh wanted 
Kashmir to be independent of both India and Pakistan, but a full scale tribal invasion backed 
by the Pakistan regulars launched on the October 22, 1947, forced the Maharaja to approach 
the Indian Government for help. The Maharaja thus unconditionally signed the Letter of 
Accession which was accepted by the Indian government which immedialtely despatched its 
army for Kashmir which forced the invaders to retreat. 
Except for the times when Persian and Arabic was the language of the rulers 
the Muslims were kept away from the benefit of the Government services. Thus, it was 
Kashmiri Hindus who were made Munshi, Patwari or Girdwar in the government hierarchy. 
It were Hindus who became the instrument of implementing the government policies when 
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the rulers came down with a heavy hand on the masses. This earned the envy and wrath of 
Muslims. Another reason for the increasing disaffection was the widening gulf between the 
rich and the poor. The deprived sections let loo?e a reign of terror in valley. 
Power was in the hands of the Muslims after accession. There was no 
Kashmiri Pandit in the executive committee of the National conference in 1990. P.L. Handoo, 
a Kashimiri pandit was the only special invitee to the meeting Though Kashmiri Muslims lag 
behind in their educational qualification, their representation in state services is proportionate 
to their population. 
Table 1 
Percentage of each community employed in the government department as on 1-71987. 
Cat^ory of service 
Gazetted 
Non gazetted 
Inferior 
Hindus 
1.18 
37.^ 9 
29.42 
Muslims 
41.71 
56.23 
65.52 
Sikhs 
5.82 
4.23 
2.06 
Others 
1.59 
1.64 
3.00 
Source: Ministry of Home affairs, government of India annual report of 1991 
Percentage of employment and the percentage of each community 
Name of the community 
Hindus 
Muslims 
Sikhs 
Others 
Total 
No of employees in the 
Government Service 
70382 
110931 
7282 
3764 
192359 
%in 
Employment 
36.59 
57.67 
3.79 
1.95 
100.00 
%in 
Population 
32.24 
64.16 
2.23 
1.34 
100.00 
Source : Ministry of Home affairs, government of India annual report of 1991. 
Most thinkers argue that despite differences, there is no question on Hindu or 
Muslim communalism. Nor was there any serious conflict or confix>ntation. As there was no 
political, social or psychological difference between them a bond was developed. The only 
difference which existed was that of faith. Even the language spoken was common. 
Kashmiriyat was thus a spuit, a culture of synthesis, understanding and humanism. For S. 
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Abdullah too, Kashmiriyat symbolised a spirit of independence and secularism joined by free 
will to a larger community It meant a rejection of slavery, hegemony and mutual regenerative 
creativity*. 
What is unfortunate today is that what began as a melting pot of different 
cultures Buddhism, Hindusim, Naga worship and Advaitism and Islamic influences has 
disappered. Customs and cultures which were age old were wiped out in an instant at the 
instigation of Pakistan. 
The differences which began to arise with the Dogra rule were restricted to 
the upper echelons. It did not really percolate to the masses even though the Muslim 
conference now known as the National Conference did attempt to channelize their discontent 
Muslims voiced their demands, for the first time when the Governor General Lord Reading 
visited Kashmir. Basically their wrath was directed against Maharaja Han Singh. 
The clergy also had a very important role to play as it was through them that 
petitions, were submitted and ^ either through ignorance or through conservatism, they 
disallowed the inculcation of a new vision in the minds of the muslims. They did not realise 
that it was their backwardness in education which deprived them of jobs and demanded 
reforms on grounds of discrimination. It was not the Dogra rulers but the Britishers who in 
the pursuance of dieir policy of divide and rule sowed the seeds of distrust in Kashmir, This 
was furdier nurtured by Pakistan subsequently for its own strategic interest. 
The Jamaat-e-Islami became the most vocal instrument of the Muslim clergy. 
Jamaat preaches reactionary obscurantist ideology. It presents Islam as a political ideology 
and not as a religious pedagogy. Adbul AlaMaududi, its founder explicitly claimed that 
Islam was a political ideology comparable to communism and fascism. It also preaches 
militancy. It calls upon Muslims to reorganize themselves into a revolutionary party with the 
37 
aim of captaring total power .Uiider Maududi, Jamaat preached that the aim of Islam was to 
establish the sovereignity of God on earth or an Islamic state and not the spirtual salvation of 
mankind. 
Jamaat in Kashmir has definitely come a long way since its inception in 1942 
in Shopian. In Kashmir, it had a two pronged strategy. It had to follow the strategy of Jamaat-
e-Islami (Hind) as well as adjust itself to the native muslim population of the state. Secondly 
it had contended with the Indian union and aimed to establish a theocratic state instead of a 
secular one within it. Jamaat in Kashmir severed its relation with Jamaat (Hind) in 19S3 as 
the Kashmiri unit did not recognise the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India .Thus 
started an era when it subtly started creeping into the politics of the state 
The secular Sheikh Adbullah was popular among the Muslims and was not 
only resented but was also an impediment to the growth of Jamaat. According to political 
expediency, successive rulers either supported it or banned it. It was in the 1970's tiiat it 
succeeded in making inroads among the students when it launched its Islami- Jamait-e-Toiba 
which opposed the 1975 accord. In the 1977 elections it won one Assembly seat from Sopore 
based on a limited alliance with the Janata Party, it could secure only 26 lakh voters. In the 
1983 elections, it drew a blank, but its share of voters increased. In 1987, after an alliance 
with Muslim United Front, it cornered 4 seats amidst widespread allegations of rigging. This 
disillusioned a large section and led to the adoption of the cuh of the gun. 
The International Conference which was convened at Srinagar and attended by 
the Imam of Kaaba was another factor which brought more people in its fold and made a 
further dent in the Muslim population. It led to the establishment of Shariat based Islamic 
courts and spread of Islamic education. Thus with Jamaats' success the institution of Muslim 
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clergy became important. Till accession, the Mulla, Qazi, Mufli and Khalifa were 
insignificant. 
Post Accession constitution too augmented this process. They saw their fate 
sealed in secular India and thus w6re on the lookout for a merger with an external force 
which would assure them supreme status. The natural and ever willing force was Pakistan. As 
the enviomment became conducive they began putting up ideas like the mosque being a 
weapon and the most relevant in politics. In the beginning, this trend was liberal and non-
fundamentalist. But it soon changed. It is this segment which constitutes the bedrock of 
secessionism and militancy in the Valley today. In pursuance with their aim of making 
Kashmir a theocratic state, they have launched a series of regressive social reforms e.g use of 
veil and prohibition. 
Though the Muslim Conference now known as the National Conference did 
come up in 1932 due to the efforts of a dozen Muslim graduates including S. Abdullah, the 
growth of the Muslim intelligentsia was belated and stunted. Slowly, there grew a rich and 
powerful bureaucracy and elite of Kashmiri Muslim intellgentsia in collaboration with the big 
trading classes (khwaja) and began to dominate the political, administrative and commercial 
life of the valley^ This created two problems. One was to keep die large majority of Muslim 
masses from reacting to their ill - gotten wealth. Second the anxiety to perpetuate their 
dominant position. Thus tfie demand for a free state, clamour to join Pakistan and rise of 
fundamentalism suited them. It helped to direct the masses from the glaring contrasts of their 
wealth. To counter this anti- India tirade, the central government devised ways of supporting 
the ruling group, in ihc process, hastening the further degeneration of Kashmiri politics and 
administration. Most Kashmiri bureaucrats catapulated to power not on the basis of merit but 
by virtue of being members of long oppressed majority community.* They estaliished links 
with rich Kashmiri Muslims who had illegally acquired their wealth. They then began a 
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process whereby the Jamaat-e-Islami grew its strength and instrument of religion was freely 
used to shield themselves'. 
Pakistan found a good opportunity in the entire situation. The masses bent 
under rampant corruption, all safety valves sealed and the total breakdown of administrative 
machinery all pointed to a situation Pakistan was waiting to exploit.'" 
The question of identity became important but it was not regional or cultural 
identity which the Muslim intelligentsia was looking for but a Muslim identity. The 
composite culture which had become associated with Kashmiri culture started being seen as 
cultural {Agression by the Hindus. 
Today, Kashmiri culture has come to symbolise Pakistani culture The nature 
of Pakistan state is clergy, landlord, military and bureaucracy based. The Kashmiri Muslim 
intelligentsia aligned itself to Pakistan, in the hope that if Kashmir secedes to Pakistan, then 
they i.e. the intelligentsia will be in a commanding position. The intellgentsia plays a 
significant role keeping m mind a weak democracy, low political consciousnes of the masses 
and firm roots of theocracy. The common Kashmiri even today is moulded in the tradition of 
rishis, of liberal mystic trend. The idea of fundamentalism has been thurst upon it by careful 
propoganda of Pakistan. 
Kashmiriyat today is no longer a consolidating or a cementing force. Now it is a 
negative, secessionist concept, fraught with communal and separatist overtones. It is 
increasingly being associated with theocracy and Islamic life style. It is a weapon in the 
hands of militants representing only sectarian and parochial interests. The Kashmiri identity, 
ethos, heritage extending over the millenia has,degenerated to a very low level. The credit for 
which goes to misled youth armed and trained in Pakistan. At the other end, it is appropriated 
as a Hindu, pre Muslim legacy of co-mingling between Shaivism and Vaishnavism". 
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CHAPTER 3 
TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS IN KASHMIR: 
HIZBUL MUZAHIDEEN 
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Terrorism is a group activity involving intimate relationships among a small 
number of people. Interactions among members of the group may be more important in 
determining behaviour than the psychological predispositions of individual members' 
Very few stwlies have focussed on the way terrorist groups are organized. 
Merari^  classifies groups into four types according to whether their target is foreign or 
domestic and whether their base of operations is foreign or domestic. 
(1) Domestically based xenofighters. These groups have a domestic base and foreign 
target 
(2) Etomestically based homofighters. A domestic base and a domestic target mark this 
category of terrorist groups. 
(3) Foreign-based xenofighters.. This class of terrorist groups attacks foreign targets and is 
based outside its homeland, llie inmiediate target and the primary target of their attacks 
may be different entities. 
(4) Foreign-based homofighters. This type of group attacks its own countrymen but 
operates from a base outside its homeland. 
Jenkins^ argues tiiat little is known about how terrorist organizations make 
decisions and the behavioral pattern of terrorists. He lists several factors which could afTect 
the tactics used by a terrorist group. 
1. Background of the membership, e.g., previous military training. 
2. Size of the acting group. 
3. Cultural background. 
4. Ideology. 
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5. Idiosyncracies of key actors. 
6. Circumstances of the act, e.g., geographic location. 
7. Universal "rules of the game". 
Earlier studies suggest that many factors, some of which have yet to be 
investigated, may affect the operations of terrorist groups. They also suggest that terrorism is 
imitative. There is very little originality, and in spite of tiie availability of weapons, mass 
destruction is not generally a tactic of terrorism. 
Grabosky^ states that most terrorist groups are organized in urban areas where 
the group can be assembled and disbanded quickly. The basic organization is cellular, i.e., the 
group is divided into many smaller units for security purposes. The normal cell has only three 
to five members. The acting group, the group actually involved in the terrorist act, is small, 
averaging only 4.4 members. This is partly because there is an increased security risk among 
large groups. The more people that know about the plans, members, and resources, the higher 
ttie risk. 
Wolf^  outlines the organization of the urban terrorist group. A group must 
have goals which form the basis for the organization. The cell is the basic unit of 
organization for purposes of assigning specific tasks to specific units. Thus, there is a 
division of labour as different cells perform different duties. A cell generally consists of 
three to ten members. Cells are then grouped into columns. Each column has specific 
fimctions and contains 50 to 300 members. A command council provides the overall 
direction for the group. The maintenance of this structure requires fmancial resources, which 
is why many terrorist acts are committed fdr monetary gain rather than for the political 
goals of tiie group directly. 
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Further work has shed additional light on the subject of terrorist organizations. 
One member acts as cell leader and contact person with the higher organizational command. 
Cell members are given as little information about the organization as is 
necessary for them to function. They may not even know who the group's members are 
outside their ovm cell. Thus, if they are captured they have little information which can be 
divulged to the authorities. 
According to Wilkinson^ the overall organization normally consists of, 500 
to 2, 000 members. Gurr^  puts the figure somewhat lower. His figures indicate that 86 
percent of the terrorist groups have fewer than.SO members. Another 8 percent have between 
SO and SOO and only 6 percent have more than SOO. 
There are likely to be psychological or background differences between 
leaders and cadres.* For example, a survey of contemporary terrorist movements found that 
leaders are usually older, than their followers, which is not historically unusual. In general, 
data are scant on individual terrorist leaders, their exercise of authority, the basis for it, and 
their interactions with their followers. Furthermore, if there is a predisposition to terrorism, 
the terrorism-prone individual who obtains psychic gratification from the experience is likely 
to be a follower, not a leader who commands but does not perform the act. 
Terrorists live and make decisions under conditions of extreme stress. As a 
clandestine minority, the members of a terrorist group are isolated from society, even if they 
live in what Menachem Begin called the "open underground". 
Terrorists can confide in and trust only each other. The nature of their 
commitment cuts them off from society; they inhabit a closed community that is forsaken 
only at great cost. Isolation and the perception of a hostile environment intensify shared 
belief and commitment and make faith in the cause imperative. A pattern of mutual 
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reassurance, solidarity, and comradeship develops, in which the members of the group 
reinforce each other's self-righteousness, image of a hostile world, and sense of mission. 
Because of the real danger terrorists confront, the strain they live under, and tfie moral 
conflicts they undergo, they value solidarity liighly. Terrorists are not necessarily people 
who seek "belonging" or personal integration through ideological commitment, but once 
embarked on the path of terrorism, they desperately need the group and the cause. Isolation 
and internal consensus explain how the beliefs and values of a terrorist group can be so 
drastically at odds with those of society at large. 
In their intense commitment, separation from the outside world, and 
intolerance of internal dissent, terrorist groups resemble religious sects or cults. 
The terrorists' willingness to accept high risks may also be related to the belief 
that one's death will be avenged., The prospect of retribution gives the act of terrorism and 
the death of the terrorist meaning and continuity, even fame and immortality. Vengeance may 
be not only a ftinction of anger but of a desire for transcendence. 
Shared guilt is surely a strong force in binding members of the terrorist group 
together. Ahnost all terrorists seem compelled to justify their behavior, and this anxiety 
cannot be explained solely by reference to their desire to create a public image of virtuous 
sincerity. Justifications usually focus on past suffering, on the glorious future to be created, 
and on the regime's illegitimacy and violence, to which terrorism is the only available 
response. Shared guilt and anxiety increase the group's interdependence and mutual 
commitment and may also make followers more dependent on leaders and on the common 
ideology as sources of moral authority. 
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TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS IN KASHMIR: 
Militant groups are known as Mujahide - Tanjeems in Kashmir. They are an 
interesting study in formation and dissipation. Emerging like meteors, they suddenly vanish 
into oblivion. Others like the JKLF, try to shed their past and attempt to reinvent them in a 
new mould. Till date, no one has been able to give an exact count of the number of terrorist 
organisations in Kashmir.^  
While Jagmohan claims 44 outfits in January 1990, JKLF Chairman 
Amanullah Khan claims 60-70 groups were active in 1991.'° Media reports commonly speak 
of about two dozen underground organisations operating. Most of these are splinter groups 
based in particular localities and habitually moving in and out of loose alliances and merger 
with other groups. In some cases, their independence from one another appears nominal than 
teal. There is loose coordination of militant group activities, but no central command for 
formal integration of military operation. 
On the basis of their relation with Pakistan a four fold classification of the 
terrorist organisations operational in Kashmir has been done here. 
a. THE UBERAL GROUP: 
Their demand is Azadi outside Pakistan. The important organisations which come in 
this category are the JKLF and the Muslim United Front. They favour total self 
determination. 
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Force (JKLF) :- By virtue of its espousal of 
Kashmir's independence, and a moderate brand of Islam, it is a popular group. Amanullah 
Khan is its chief and its headquarters are at Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Founded in 1968 as 
Kashmir National Liberation Front, it has come a long way. There are claims that it was 
initially a group called Plebiscite Front (not Mirza A ^ l Beg's) but an organization created 
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out of fragments of Operation Gibraltar", of resistance movements on the Indian side of the 
cease fire line in Jammu and Kashmir which it had then been the aim of Pakistan to 
encourage. Perhaps the name Plebiscite Front was exploited in an attempt to radicalize 
supporters of that organization of the same name which had been founded by Mirza A. Beg 
and was far removed from advocating violent action. Initially it operated in total 
independence from any ofHcial body in Pakistan. They began using covert resistance against 
Indian government, responsible to nobody but their ovm leadership, and controlled by no 
government. The leaders genuinely believed that ihey were acting in the interest of Kashmiri 
nationalism. But it was only in 1988-89, that Amanullah Khan and his associates really 
began to affect the course of political life in Jammu and Kasmir. They represented by no 
means the only organization involved in the deterioration in the security situation. Resistance 
factions too had proliferated under a bewildering array of names - Hizub-Ullah, Tigers of 
Allah, Al Omar Mujahideen. However, members of JKLF were singled out as the main 
culprits to explain the internal disorder in Kashmir. Now the traditional demonstrations and 
marches were replaced by the armed processions. From the second half of 1989, they 
became vociferously aggressive. They were responsible for the murder of T.L. Taploo on 
15th September 1989, kidnapping of Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed, brutal murder of General Manager 
of Hindustan Machine Tools H.L. Khera, Vice Chancellor of Kashmir University Prof. 
Mushir Ul-Haq, his Secretary Abdul Ghani in April 1990 etc. 
Initially the vanguard of secular militancy, today it is increasingly losing out 
to what can be seen as hard core elements.JKLF's bases can be found in Karachi, Islamabad 
in Pakistan. Muzaffarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In Jammu and Kashmir in 
Anantnag and Srinagar, as Urban and Rural Cells. In Europe and West Asia too they have 
regional cells. 
Their main leaders are Aman-Ullah Khan, Ashraf Abdul Hamid Deenani, Dr. 
Farooq Haider, Raza Musharaf, Md. Ashraf Gani, Yasin Malik, Hamid Sheikh and Hashim 
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Quereshi who engineered the successful hijacking of Ganga, an Indian Airlines Plane to 
Pakistan in 1971. 
Post 1989 Maqbool Butt's Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 
spearheaded the millitancy . It killed four air force officers at Rawalpura (Srinagar) on 
January 25, 1990 . Indian Oil executive director K E>oraiswamy was then abducted, and 
released in exchange for Javed Ahmed Shalla. The consequent terror led to the exodus of 
nearly 3.S lakh Hindus from the valley.'^ 
Muslim United Front (MUF):- Today, it is a splintered and dormant 
organization. It demands autonomy and self-determination. Its leadership mcluded Qazi 
Nissar, Abdul Gani Lone, Hafiz Makhdooml, Maulvi Abbas Ansari, Ghulam Shah, Abdul 
WazBilal. 
B. THE REUGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISTS-
They demand Islamisatio'n and merger with Pakistan .Among others, it includes 
Hizbul Mujahideen and the Harkat -ul- Ansar ,the two dreaded terrorist organisations in 
Kashmir. The Harkat -ul-Ansar is mentioned later in the chapter. 
Hizbul Mujahideen :- The other most powerful group is Hizbul Mujahideen. 
According to interviewed security personnel, it is fully patronized and funded by 
Pakistan.Hence better trained,hardcore and greatly feared. Its leader is S. S. Geelani^Supreme 
commander is Mohd Yusuf Shah Salahuddin, Operation commander is Junaid, Strength lOSO, 
area of influence is J&K_: Formed in 1982 to fight the jihad in Afghanistan, this militant 
organisation has maximum cadre strength. 
Hizbul's decline started when Pakistani state patronage shifted from the 
Jamaat-e-Islami toJamaat-e-Ulema Islami. The group split, with Al Badr joining the new 
dispension , which backed the Harkat-ul-Ansar and Lashkar-e-Toiba. The elimination of 
Hizbul Mujahideen's top commander, Ali Mohammed Dar and his key aides, threw the group 
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into further disarray. Most surrendererd militants are from HizbuL. This organisation has 
been discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
Lashkar - e- Toiha :- It's chief is Ata-ul-Rahman. Deputy commander-in-chief 
is Qazi-al-Dakhi. Strength - around SOO. Area of influence - whole of Jammu & Kashmir 
except South Kashmir. Formed with the help of Lahore based organisation Markat-e-Dawat-
ul-Irshad (MDI). It is pro Pakistan. About 70-80% of its cadres are foreign militants, mostly 
Pakistani and Afghan nationals. The group is said to organise training camps in Pakistan. 
Regarded as one with the deadliest weapotuy, it also has a modem communication 
sysbsmAl-Badr:- Leader - Lukmaan, strenghth about 300, area of influence - Srinagar 
district. A breakaway group made up of mostly foreign mercenaries in the Hijbul-
Mujahideena couple of years back. 
Al Barq:- Patron A. G. Lone, strength about 150, area of influence Kupwara, 
Baramula & Bandipur districts . This pro Pakistan, Gujar dominated outfit was earlier 
favoured by the ISI. Now it has two factions. One faction is headed by Tajmul Islam, the 
other by Farooq Qureshi. It's headquarters is in MuzafiTarabad in Pakistan. 
Al-Jehad: - Chairman - S. Hamid, Commander-in-Chief in Jammu and Kashmir-
Khaled Sheikh, strength - about 40-50, area of influence - Pulwana, Baramula, Srinagar and 
Anantnag districts. This pro Pakistan group with pistol wielding cadres was formed back in 
1974. It was the armed wing of Peoples League and was formed following the merger of 
Muslim Jaanbaz force and Kashmir Jehad Forces. 
Tehrik-e-Zehad-:- Raised by the ISI in POK during March 1997, comprises 
militants from all outfits. Here are reports of POK personnels also having joined it. It is 
meant to carry out subversive oprations near LOC. About 60-70% of its 250 add cadres are 
foreign militants. 
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Dukhtaran-e-Milat:- An all women pro Pakistan group formed in 1990, which 
suports militants. Leader Aisha Andrabi & M/s Tabassum Aziz Bashi wants women to follow 
Islamic laws but their diktats have not received much support. This organisation has been 
accused of throwing acid in the faces of unveiled women, as also delivering a parcel bomb to 
a foreign journalist. 
Ansar-ui-Islam:- The other Jamaat-e-Islami and affiliated groups 
operating are Ansar-ul-Islam, also called the Muslim Liberation Front. It's aim is 
plebiscite and finally merger with Pakistan.It's leaders are Abdul Hamid. Their 
method is armed struggle. 
Islamic Students League:- Their aim is merger with Pakistan and total 
Islamization of the State. Javed, Mir Nalka, Ashfaq Wani are some of its important leaders. 
People's League:- Founded in October 1988, uses propaganda, agitation and 
armed struggle as its methods. Its leaders were Wazir Ahmed Wani, Shahbir Shah, Aziz 
Sheikh, Farooq Rehmani. They too want merger with Pakistan and Islamization of the 
Valley. 
Allah Tiger:- They also demand merger with Pakistan and Islamic 
fundamentalism. Its methods are armed struggle and terror. Self-Styled Air Marshal Noor 
Khan is its leader. 
The other groups which demand Islamisation and merger with Pakistan are 
Htbe-Islami, Al Omar Mujahideen, Ikhwan Jul Musalmaan, Al Fatah, Harkat-ul-Ansar etc. 
Hurriyet-E-Kashmir :- There have been a number of efforts since the uprising 
began to forge a common pro separatist movement from the valley's political, religious 
,student, mtellectual, professional and social organizations. The first of these was the 
Tehreek Hurriyet-e-Kashmir. It was an Islamist leaning umbrella organization. It excluded 
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groups allied to the JKLF. But barely functioned. In April, 1993, it was replaced by a larger 
alliance that combined a dozen or more groups. This was called the All Party Hurriyet 
Conference. It included the JKLF and on the surface at least appeared to bridge the 
ideological divide. Led nominally by Maulvi Omar Farooq, a pir and joining together most 
of the valley's best known separatist politicians. The Hurriyet shot into prominence during 
the month long crisis in October-November 1993, over the militants seizure of tiie Hazratbal 
shrine in Srinagar. They believe a hair from Prophet Mohammed's beard is preserved in 
Hazratbal. The relic was brought from Lahore to Srinagar in 1700. Some 40 odd second 
rung militants had held tiie government to ransom for 15 days, in internationalizing the issue. 
On I5ih October Kashmir IGP A.K. Suri was informed by the Muslim Auquf Trust member 
G.M. Chisti that militants inside the shrine had tampered with the locks leading to the room 
in which the relic was kept. Lt Gen. M.A. Zaki - Security advisor to the Governor ordered 
two BSF companies to surround the mosque and block all entry and exit points before 
rushing to the Governor. The local police, civil administration, BSF, army intelligence were 
all aware that the militants had been using the shrine as a hideout for the past eight months. 
Al Umar Militants held arms displays within the mosque. The Hurriyet leader Professor 
Abdul Ghani, S.A.S. Geelani and Abdul Ghani Lone got a new platform to cover ground 
activities. They tried to negotiate with the militants for a compromise solution. They 
organised strikes, boycotts, mass public demonstrations to protest against the governments 
seige tactics. Their influence in the valley seemed to rival that of militant organisations. 
They seemed to have a greater role as elections were proposed to be held on 
tiie 18tii of July, 1995, after the expiry of President's rule in Kashmir. They got a better 
platform during the SAARC Conference where their leaders met the Pakistani President 
Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari in New Delhi. 
But it was the newly formed Harkat-ul-Ansar, an Afghan based mercenary 
group who torched the Charar-e-Sharief Shrine on 11th May, 1995. Hurriyet leaders who 
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came to the forefront were Abdul Ghani Lone, Shabir Shah, Yasin Malik. They tried 
marching towards the shrine but were detained by the police^^. The All Party Hurriyet 
Conference has emerged as a strong force. It is an umbrella organization of 36 parties, with 
highly divergent views. There are certain moderate elements who have opposed the gun 
culture and favour a political dialogue. 
c THE FENCE SITTERS-
Those Organisations which vacillate between self determination and merger with 
Pakistan. There is a large chunk of them. Some of them are Kashmir Liberation Army, 
Kashmir Liberation Organization, Falah-e-Am Trust, Muslim Janbaz Force. There are also a 
couple of groups which are Shia groups with unclear aims like Karbalai, Al Khomeini. 
These small groups under zonal or Area Commands know very little about the overall 
strategy or even the true identity of their leaders. Their capture or surrender has very little 
impact on the terrorist capacity to attack. These young men, mostly below 25 years of age, 
who generally belong to Srinagar, Sopore, Anantnag, Kupwara, are unlikely to make 
hardened fighters. Out of every 10,000 men who are reported to be under training, some 
could prove good material for continuing the armed struggle. These small groups have, 
however, acquired a zonal identity which motivates them. Such group loyalties are known to 
have a dynamic influence on group members who after some "de individualization" care very 
little about personal safety. Besides these, the magic effect of words like 'Jehad', based on 
Islamic lore, 'Azadi', and 'anti-authoritarian', keeps them going. The group and ideology 
serves as a psychological trap from where exit is not easy. The basic structure of these outfits 
is standard and their ideology well set. There is also very little ambiguity in their aims. 
Other than tiiis, there is a plethora of support groups. They are the main sources of 
information and intelligence to these outfits. They identify targets, observe movements of 
52 
security personnel, locate those chosen for assassination, and act as couriers. A second 
category gives logistical support during an operation. Yet other group provides a safe haven 
for weapons and ammunition. Every trained terrorist requires a minimum of five supporters. 
Agitational terrorism has been successfully adopted in Jammu and Kashmir. In this 
tiiere is a special groupp of mass contact motivators involved. There are yet tiiose who carry 
on props^anda by word of mouth, cassettes and leaflets. Another group concerns itself with 
financial assistance. 
d. NON CA TEGORISED GROUPS : 
These groups do not provide categorised services. They perform a number of 
functions together. Hence cannot be compartmentalized. Some of these are Zia Tigers, 
Islamic Jamait Tulba (Students Wing), Operational Balakote, Kashmir Freedom Army 
Guerrilla Commando, Students Liberation Front, Kashmir Freedom Movement, Al 
Mehrmoodi Mujahadin Inquillabi Council, Victory Commando Force, Islami Jamurie 
Kashmir, J&K Inquilabi Front, Tehrik Jehad, Hizb-Ullah Islamic Jammohuria, J.K. Free 
Army, Hiz-ul-Zaheed, Al Hamizah, Jinnah Liberation Tiger. 
Other small groups include Al Umar Mujahideen, Tehrik ul Mujahiden, 
Muslim ul Mujahidden, Hizbullah and Taliban-e-Kashmir, number of total militants is about 
250. North of Pir Panjal mountains. (Kupwara, BaramuUa, Srinagar, Badgam, Anatnag, 
Pulwana Districts), the strength is around 15S0, South of Pir Panjal (Poonch, Rajouri, 
Udhampur, Ekxia districts) it is about 950. The numbers do not include militants on the other 
side of the border, either awaiting infiltration or undergoing traning. 
Hizbul Mujahideen: 
In November 1989, when efforts to win over the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front (JKLF) to its pro-Pakistan project failed, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
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recruited JKLF cadre to set up a new organisation. Mohammad Ashraf Dar, Maqbooi Illahi 
and Abdullah Bangroo formed al-Badr, which was renamed Hizbul Mujahideen shortly 
afterwards. Ahsan Dar, who was recently released from jail only to form a new organisation, 
was appointed its chief By 1991, major groups, such as the Tehreek-e-Jihad Islami led by 
Abdul Majid Dar, the Hjzb negotiator with the Union government, had merged with the new 
outfit. 
On November 11 1991, Mohammad Yusuf Shah, who goes by the name Syed 
Salahuddin, took over the operation, replacing Ahsan Dar. The move marked the takeover of 
the Hizb by the Jamaat-e-Islami. Dar, after being kidnapped in May 1992, was forced to set 
up a new organisation, the Muslim Mujahideen. The Muslim Mujahideen is now a pro-India 
militia, operating in the Acchabal area under the command of Ghulam Nabi Azad. 
From the outset, the Hizb has adopted aggressive, and often communal 
postures. Responsible for an estimated 65 per cent of the violence in Jammu and Kashmir, the 
organisation is behind the liquidation of several Muslim religious leaders opposed to the Ja 
maat-e-Islami worldview and has played a role, though less frequently than other 
organisations, in mass killings of Hindus. It has backed bans on cinema and other supposed 
vices. 
The Hizb has its own news agency, Kashmir Press International, and a 
women's wing, Banat-ul-Islam. Overseas, it is backed by Ghulam Nabi Fai's Kashmir 
American Council and Ayub Thakur's World Kashmir Freedom Movement. 
The Hizbul Mujahideen is very close to both the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir 
and Pakistan. Most of the cadres of the Hizbul are drawn from the Jammat-e-Islami of 
Kashmir. The Hizbul advocates Kashmir's merger with Pakistan and also campaigns for 
Islamisation of Kashmir. In a November 14, 1998 press conference, the mainstream Jamaat 
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leadership had said that the organisation was not connected with terrorism in any way and 
that it was committed to democratic and constitutional means to achieve its goal. 
It's leader is Syed Salaudin alias Pir Sahib. It's Operational Areas are districts 
of Poonch, Rajouri and E)oda. Among other leaders main are Master Ahsan Dar, Ghulam 
Rasool Shah alias Imran Rahi, Abdul Hameed Butt alias Bombar Khan, Mustafa Khan, 
The major source for its finances has been the ISI. The ISI and its mercenary 
outfits like the Harkat and the LeT need local knowledge and support and this is provided by 
the HM which has tfie strongest presence in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. According to 
reports, the HM receives nearly 1 crore rupees from the ISI and is the biggest beneficiary of 
die funds given by the ISI. However, the ISI, according to Indian intelligence sources, is now 
promoting Masood Azhar's Jaish-e-Mohammad at the cost of HM. It has Links with Inter 
Services Intelligence, Jamaat-e-Islami, United Jihad Council, and other terrorist organizations 
operating out of Pakistan. 
Early in its history, the Hizbul Mujahideen had established contacts with 
Afghan mujahideen groups such as Hizb-e-Islami under which its cadre received arms 
training. The spotlight turned tp this outfit in year 2000 whi^ n its chief commander 
(Operations), Abdul Majeed Dar made a conditional offer of ceasefire at a press conference 
in Srinagar on 24 July. The endorsement of this offer by the group's supremo Syed 
Salahuddin alias Pir Sahib, followed in an Islamabad press conference on 25 July. This was 
the second instance when a terrorist outfit in Kashmu* declared a ceasefire, after the Yasin 
Malik faction of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) did so in 1994. Three 
conditions were put forward for the ceasefire by Abdul Dar, while addressing the press 
conference where three top local commanders of the outfit were also present. The conditions 
were, "...no use of force against mujahidiit (terrorists), human rights violations on the 
Kashmiris will end and people even with different political convictions will be allowed free 
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expression". Other terrorist outfits operating in J&K were prompt in rej^ting^the offer. An .>^  
umbrella body of 17 Pakistan based terrorist outfits, the Muttahida Jihad Coiui 
under the leadership of its deputy chairman Mohammad Usman (chief of the Muslim Janbaz 
Force) and rejected the move. Reacting to this stand, the MJC's chairman Syed Salahuddin 
disassociated himself and the Hizbul Mujahideen fh}m the decision. Even as negotiations 
began between the government and Hizb delegations in Srinagar, the outfit imposed a new 
conditionality tiiat Pakistan had to be invited to the dialogue, a condition promptly rejected 
by the government. The ceasefire was consequently called off by the outfit on August 8, 
2000. In a move similar to the July 2000 ceasefire, the HM's Division Commander of 
Srinagar Asad Yazdani [M-oposed a political dialogue for resolving the Kashmir issue on 20 
November 2001. He stated that the HM will float a political party and work towards a 
peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem. However, the outfit disowned the statement and 
Junaid-ul-Islam, while introducing himself as the new spokesman for the HM in Kashmir, 
stated that, "Yazdani is not holding any positions and has been relieved of his responsibilities 
as Divisional Conunander. The HM is a jihadi group only and no separate political party will 
be floated to solve the Kashmir problem". 
Main Operations 
1. The outfit's first major strike is believed to be against the Mirwaiz of Kashmir, Moulvi 
Mohammed Farooq. According to the police, Bangroo and his two associates conspired to 
kill Moulvi Farooq on May 21, 1990. The subsequent disorder that followed the killing 
resulted in firing, which left 26 killed. 
2. On June 29, 1991 its activists kidnapped Mohammed Imam Khan, Kashmir's director of 
food and supplies. 
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3. The HM entrusted the task of killing Wali Mohammed Itoo, a National Conference leader 
and the former speaker of the legislative assembly to two of its trusted, Pakistani trained 
activists, Ghulam Hassan Lone and Bashir Ahmed Padroo. Itoo was shot dead while 
returning home after Friday prayers on 18 March, 1994 in Jammu city. Both the assailants 
escaped. 
4. Since 1997, this group has been operating in tandem with the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Among 
their joint operations include the Wandhama and the Chittisinghpora massacres. In 
association with the Harkat-ul-Ansar, the group attacked an Army camp in Nathnusha, 
Kupwara district on August 6,1999 killing five army men including a Captain. 
5. The Hizbul Mujahideen was also responsible for setting on fire the Muslim shrine of 
Charar-e-Sharif in 1995. Mast Gul, a mercenary from across the Line of Control, entered 
Kashmir in 1994 and on 11 May 1995, he burnt the shrine and escaped along with other 
HM militants. 
6. On 23 May 1998, at Qamarwari on the outskirts of Srinagar, a landmine partially 
destroyed a vehicle and injured ruling party legislator and president of Youth National 
Conference, Ghulam Nabi Shaheen. He lost his left leg due to the blast. On 24 May, the 
HM claimed responsibility for the blast. 
7. Among other major attacks by the group was an Improvised Explosive Devise (lED) blast 
targeted at a security forces convoy in Tral which killed 11 policemen on February 18, 
2000. 
8. The HM spokeman, Salim Hashmi, claimed on 26 April 2001 that its mujahideens had 
killed 51 Indian soldiers, injured 137 and destroyed 34 balracks during a two day 
operation against the Indian army in Kashmir. The HM had given an ultimatum to the 
Indian army that it will carry out at least 35 attacks between the nights of 23 and 24 April. 
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9. The HM claimed responsibility for killing 9 Indian soldiers and injuring 6 others in two 
landmine explosions near Ghulab Gadh area in Udhampur district on 9 September 2001. 
Its spokesman, Salim Hashmi, released the statement. 
The ceasefire declared by Hizbul Mujahideen in held Kashmir caused a major 
split in the Kashmir Jihad. But this split was not the first to happen although it was politically 
the most high-profile event in recent years. 
A split had taken place in 1997 between Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri 
Mujahideen. It wa& between Majeed Dar and the over-all leader Syed Salahuddin, and its 
outward sign was a mine explosion at the Kotli camp in which a number of people including 
some army personnel lost their lives. Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan wanted to avert a split at all 
costs. Qazi Hussain Ahmad persuaded Syed Salahuddin not to split, but one commander 
Bakht Zamin did break-away in 1998 and formed his own Al-Badr militia. 
Al-Badr: 
The name Al-Badr was revived for use by the Pakistan and Afghan cadres of 
the Hizbul Mujahideen in the summer of 1998. Its formation came about as a result of 
growing differences between Kashmiri-origin cadre of the Hizb, and the insurgents pumped 
in by Pakistan, over issues such as leadership, funding and the direction of their activities. 
The final break came after the Jamaat-e-Kashmir Amir G.M. Bhat called for an end to armed 
struggle, a move which incensed the Hizbul Mujahideen's foreign cadres. 
Early efforts to give Al-Badr a Kashmiri face by recruiting Majid Dar, failed. 
Its leadership is now wholly Pakistani. Its commander-in-chief, Nasser Ahmed, and supreme 
commander, Bhakt Zaman, are both residents of Peshawar. In 1999, because of the nature of 
its cadre, the Lashkar-e-Taiba announced it would work closely with this organisation. Al-
Badr has rejected the Hizbul Mujahideen's peace initiative. Tensions are certain to simmer in 
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the months to come. The organisation is, however, relatively smal 1, with less than 50 
operatives estimated to be active in Jammu and Kashmir at any given time. 
Jamiat-ul-Mujafaideen: 
The Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) was the first breakaway faction of the Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen (HM) that emerged out of a personality clash between Master Ahsan Dar, the 
then Chief of the outfit and Hilal Ahmed Mir. Mir, who used the code-name Nasirul Islam 
opposed the move to transform the Hizb into Jamaat-e-Islami's armed wing. It was formed in 
1990 with Sheikh Abdul Basit as its Chief. Its followers are mostly Kashmiris from tihe Able 
Sunnat (Deoband) school. 
The JUM is organised along military lines and a political Amir heads the 
organisation. It has a 'commander-in-chief and a 'vice commander-in-chief who commands 
four 'divisional commanders' who in turn command the various 'district commanders' and 
'area commanders'. According to recent news reports. Engineer Mohammed Salah is said to 
be the 'Chief Commander' of the outfit while Col. Shamas is one of the important 'District 
Commanders'. It publishes a monthly magazine Mahaz-e-Kashmir in which it enumerates its 
terrorist operations systematically. Unlike the other terrorist organisations who draw support 
along sectarian lines, the outfit recruits terrorists from all sects. But, it has not been able to 
grow into a larger outfit. The Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen played a significant role in the early 
years of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. However, it has not been able to maintain its 
momentum, despite remaining active in several parts of the State over the years. The cadre 
strength of the outfit is currently reported to be in hundreds. Many of its cadres are still in 
detention. Several JUM leaders were killed in a series of encounters after 1996, leaving its 
cadre disorganised and increasingly fragmented. The Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen considers itself as 
being a 'pure' Kashmiri organization and according to the leadership, all other terrorist outfits 
have either been suppressed or have accepted Pakistani-recruited cadres in their midst. 
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However, recent reports indicate that as the inflow of Kashmiri youth from Jammu and 
Kashmir is decreasing, the JUM now needs to recruit Pakistani youth into its ranks. A senior 
J&K police official said in April 2001 that the top 'commanders' of the Jamiat-ul-
Mujahideen had been arrested and tfie security forces were close to busting the entire outfit. 
The Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen is opposed to the All Parties Hurriyat Conference 
(APHC) whom Abdur Rafeh, a senior leader of the outfit described as a big danger for the 
terrorist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. According to him, the APHC is an obstacle in the 
way of the imposition of Islamic laws in the State. The Hurriyat, according to the JUM, has 
no right to represent the terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir. The outfit has come out strongly 
against the recent peace initiatives of both India and Pakistan as it considers violence as the 
only means to settle the Kashmir issue. The JUM also supports the accession of Jammu and 
Kashmir with Pakistan. The Jul had also termed the surrender of Hashim Qureshi, who had 
hijacked an Indian Airlines flight to Lahore in 1971, as "an act of treason" and also threatened 
to "take him to task". 
Maulana Ghulam Rasool, alias 'General' Abdullah alias Mohammad Ramzan 
Sofi, a native of Kupwara, who escaped from a Srinagar jail in February 3, 2000, is running 
their operation in Pakistan. He had earlier been arrested from Gow Kadal, Srinagar, in 1997 
for charges including the triggering of an Improvised Explosive Device (lED) at the Gupkar 
Road, adjacent to the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah's residence, in 
January 1997. Six persons were killed in the blast. He was reportedly on the list of detained 
terrorists whom the hijackers of the Indian Airlines flight IC 814 wanted to be set free in 
exchange for the hostages at Kandahar in December 2000. He had first been arrested in 1993, 
and during the next seven years, was arrested twice more. But on each occasion, Ghulam 
Rasool has managed to escape. Along with Nasirul Islam, he had formed a group called the 
Shabab-ul-Islam with a view to introduce the ideas of'freedom', 'rights' and jihad among the 
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Muslim youth of Jammu and Kashmir. The Shabab-ui-Islam culminated in the formation of 
the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen. 
In 1991, the outfit was allegedly involved in the killing of Mohanuned Sayeed, 
Joint Director in the Information Department. It is also suspected to have been involved in the 
killing of H N Wanchoo, a human rights activist in December 1992. The Jul was also 
reportedly responsible for the Badami Bagh cantonment blast in March 1993 in which 29 
persons were killed. The expertise of the outfit is reported to be in carrying out grenade 
attacks and explosions. A cadre of the Jamaitrul-Mujahideen, who was part of the fidayeen 
(suicide) squad that infihrated into the Army battalion headquarters at Beerwah in Budgam 
district and launched an attack on forces inside the camp on September 12, 2000, was 
consequently killed in an encounter. With the arrests of a JUM terrorist Muzzafar Mirza and 
his associates in Srinagar and of Nissar Ahmad Gandroo in Kolkata on January 10, 2001, the 
police foiled their plans to launch terrorist attacks on the eve of Republic Day. Nine people, 
including four security force personnel, were killed in an explosion outside the local Army 
Headquarters at Batwara in Srinagar, on December 2S. Although the Jamiat-ul-MujahidMn 
reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack, security forces suspected that the explosion 
was a joint effort of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and another terrorist outfit, the Al-Umar. 
Annual casualties in Terrorist Violence 
1988-2004 
Casualties of Terrorist Violence - 2004 
Month 
January 
February 
March 
Total 
Civilians 
31 
46 
31 
108 
Security Force 
Personnel 
21 
27 
14 
62 
Note: Compiled from news reports end ere provisbi 
Casualties of Terrorist Violence - 2003 
Month 
January. 
February 
March 
Chilians 
48 
30 
75 
Security Force 
Personnel 
21 
12 
27 
Terrorist 
86 
86 
62 
234 
lel.
Terrorist 
109 
78 
98 
Total 
138 
159 
107 
404 
Total 
178 
120 
200 
61 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August . 
September 
October 
November 
DecemlMr 
Total 
49 
67 
69 
61 • 
58 
82 
47 
39 
33 
658 
31 
33 
32 
38 
39 
38 
26 
26 
15 
338 
157 
144 
134 
125 
136 
196 
153 
121 
95 
1546 
N(Ae: Compiled from news reports and are provisional. 
Casualties of Terrorist Violence - 2002 
Year 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
Octotier 
Novemt)er 
December 
Total 
Civilians 
70 
50 
63 
81 
84 
. 54 
. 91 
76 
92 
59 
75 
44 
839 
Security Force 
Personnel 
35 
16 
38 
33 
34 
20 
34 
38 
68 
65 
61 
27 
469 
Terrorist 
173 
130 
144 
175 
163 
96 
110 
155 
145 
168 
119 
136 
1714 
237 
244 
235 
224 
233 
316 
226 
186 
143 
2542 
Total 
278 
196 
245 
289 
281 
170 
235 
269 
305 
292 
255 
207 
3022 
Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional. 
Annual casualties in Terrorist Violence 
1988 - 2001 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
Total 
Incidents 
390 
2154 
.3905 
3122 
4971 
4457 
4484 
4479 
4224 
3004 
2993 
2938 
2835 
3278 
47234 
Terrorists 
1 
• 0 
183 
614 
873 
1328 
1651 
1338 
1194 
1177 
1045 
1184 
1808 
2850 
15246 
Civilians 
29 
79 
862 
594 
859 
1023 
1012 
1161 
1333 
840 
877 
799 
842 
1067 
11377 
Security 
Force 
Personnel 
1 
13 
132 
185 
177 
216 
236 
297 
376 
355 
339 
555 
638 
590 
4102 
Total 
31 
92 
1177 
1393 
1909 
2567 
2899 
2796 
2903 
2372 
2261 
2538 
3288 
4507 
30725 
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Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional. 
Now that the Hizbul Mujahideen has decided to go its own way under 
commander Majeed Dar, further splits are feared on both sides. It is said tfiat Dar was able to 
aimounce the ceasefire after 'breaking' a number of commanders belonging the clique around 
Syed Salahuddin, which forced the latter to accept the ceasefire on the pain of being without 
any following in liie Hizb. 
The Kashmiri side of the Hizb too was under pressure. One split that happened 
among the Kashmiris was the revolt of Commander Masood of the Pir Panjal Regiment, a 
branch of the Kashmiri Hizb. He has declared that he would not abide by the ceasefire of the 
Hizb and would continue to fight. 
The developments at the end of July 2000 were so rapid that most observers 
were not able to interpret them. Qazi Hussain Ahmad was accused by some militants of 
having agreed to the ceasefire plan, but soon it became apparent that Qazi Sahib was in fact 
quite resentful about not being taken into confidence about it. In fact, Qazi Hussain Ahmad 
greatly weakened by the new developments. 
Al-Badr of Bakht Zamin is already opposed to him; now he also lost Syed 
Salahuddin to the Kashmiri Hizb. It can be said that he is a religious leader without a Jihadi 
militia in his tutelage, which is a sure sign of weakness in Pakistan. This has led to the 
speculation in Pakistan that the split in Jihad has been engineered by the ISI because the 
Musharraf government wished to bring India under international pressure before the 
Musharraf-Vajpayee meeting in New York in September 2000. 
The Hurriyet leader Syed Ali Gilani who has left the presidentship of the party 
is the leader of Jamaat Islami of Kashmir, the parent party of the Hizb. He has been replaced 
by Gani Bhatt, leader of the Muslim Conference. At the same time, the leadership of the 
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Mutahidda Jehadi Council in Pakistan has been given to Commander Usman of the Muslim 
Janbaz Force belonging to the Muslim Conference of Azad Kashmir. 
As if on cue, the leader of Muslim Conference Sardar Qayyum supported the 
ceasefire in Held Kashmir. 
The bringing in of foreign terrorists has in a key sense impaired the 
operational abilities of terrorist groups. As Frontline's exclusive interview of Pakistani 
terrorist Mohanmiad Asim illustrates, tensions between local and foreign members of the 
Hizbul Mujahideen have in some areas led to a near-vertical split on regional lines. In Doda, 
similar tensions have on several occasions led to shootouts between foreign and Kashmiri 
members of the Hizbul Mujahideen. 
Other organisations, too, face similar problems. While Kashmiri and Pakistani 
members of these sorganisations blame each other for the internecine disputes, the fact is that 
they are deeply rooted in cultural and linguistic antagonisms. Kashmiri folk culture is replete 
with legends of atrocities committed under Afghan rule, and Punjabi-speaking Pakistani 
terrorists are viewed with similar suspicion 
It is not surprising that the Jehadi militias have begun to split. This tendency, 
as we have seen, has been there since 1996, but in the year 2000 the additional element of 
Jihad fatigue is also to be considered. The Afghan Jihad as a model for Kashmir could not 
have suited Pakistan in the long run because of its inherent lack of discipline and organization 
and the consequent 'softness' among the militias to penetration by informers damaging 
Islamabad's policy of'denlability'. 
The Afghan Jihad was also split in its early stages. The splits were to the 
advantage of the agencies handling them, who then established better control over the Jihad. 
The splits in the Kashmir Jihad, engineered or not, must redound to the advantage of its 
handlers for the same reason'^ 
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The Harkat-ul-Ansar (HA) was formed on October 13, 1993, in Muzaffarabad, 
following the merger of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HJI). 
Initially, its objective was stated to be to organise humanitarian relief for the Afghan refugees 
in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. A few months after its formation, 
the HUM decided to send volunteers into Afghanistan for assisting the Afghan Mujahideen 
groups. The recruitment was initially done in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir 
(POK). The HUM was estimated to have recruited about 5,000 volunteers and sent them into 
Afghanistan. The money came from Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Osama bin Laden 
was an important contribute), the arms and ammunition from the CIA through the ISI and 
the training was given by the Pakistan army. Subsequently, the HUM recruited volunteers 
from the Muslim communities in other countries too. About 6,000 volunteers were thus 
recruited from Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Jammu & Kashmir of India, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Philippines.Its volunteers have since participated in terrorist 
operations in Myanmar, Kashmir, Tajikistan and Bosnia. 
On February 17,1998, Abdul Aziz Kamilov, the Foreign Minister of 
Uzbekistan, for the first time accused the Markaz, the HUM and the TJ of fomenting Islamic 
extremism and violence in Uzbekistan. He revealed that 400 pei^ons from Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan were undergoing training in arms and ammunition m the training centres of these 
organisations located in the Karachi, Islamabad, Mardan and Peshawar areas.The HA also 
purchased arms and ammunition directly from the arms market of Darra Adam Khel in the 
NWFP. 
It is a Sunni organisation, closer to the Deoband school of thought and to 
Wahabism. Like the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, it holds the sufi tradition of tolerance of other 
religions and the importance of the teacher (guru)-taught (sishya) relationship as the 
corrupting influence of Hinduism on Islam. It also holds that the woman's position is at home 
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and denounces pluralist, parliamentary democracy and equal rights for women as the 
corrupting influence of the West on Islamic societies 
HA militants are fanatic Sunni Muslims and distinguished themselves from 
other Sutmi Muslims by describing themselves as Ansar, the term given to actual Muslim 
residents of Medina by Prophet Mohammad. The jehadi activities of HJI began when Amir 
Ershad Ahmed, Qari Saifiillah Akhtar and Maulana Abdus Samad Siyal went to Afghanistan 
on February 25, 1980, to participate in the jehad against Soviet troops along with Ahmed 
Shah Masood and Prof Berhanuddin Rabbani's forces. On June 25, 1985, Ershad Ahmed was 
killed. Maulana Saifullah Akhtar then succeeded him as Amir. The HA split into two groups 
in 1997. One group was led by Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil and the other by Mufti 
Mohd. Uvais Kashmiri. 
In PoK and Pakistan, its office-bearers include an Amir with Naib Amirs, a 
secretary, a publicity chief, a finance chief and a training incharge. According to journalist 
Rahimullah Yusufzai of Pakistan, this organisation is close to Osama bin Laden.Due to it's 
violent activities the United States declared it a terrorist organisation after which a split 
occurred in at and the two factions that emerged abandoned the old name. 
HUM activist, who had claimed to have fought agamst the Indian army in 
Kashmir, said : " We try to go wherever our Muslim brothers are terrorised, without any 
monetary consideration. He further stated, "Separate cells look after the training, operations 
and fimds within the organisation. A typical Harkat sympathiser first contacts one of its 
offices and offers his services for jehad anywhere in the world. The sympathiser, after the 
necessary in-house security clearance, is then sent for a ten-day training programme. Later, 
he is sent to the relevant Harkat commander, who arranges weapons and selects routes to 
transport the Mujahid to the area of operation to work under a field commander. Each worker 
volunteers his services for 40 to 120 days. 
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"The Mujahid is told in advance that in case of martyrdom, his body would 
not be brought back to Pakistan and he would be buried at the place of the operation. The 
Harkat takes full care of the families of the martyrs. Our brave warriors are buried in 
Kashmir, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Burma and the Philippines. Muslims in those countries would 
never forget these courageous boys from Pakistan. We always tell those intending to join us 
that we are devoted to Islamic jehad and, by joining us, you have chosen a path that may take 
you to death HUM office-bearers also claimed that amongst the foreign volunteers trained by 
them were 16 Afro-American Muslims from the US. They also claimed that since the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid in India in December 1992, the HUM had been receiving 
fimds from some members of the Indian Muslim community in the UK. 
The "News" identified Fazlur Rahman Khalil as the head of the HUM. 
However, the US State Department's Counter-Terrorism Division identifies the leader of the 
HUM as Maulana Sadaatullah Khan. It is believed that while Rahman Khalil heads the HUM 
for the whole of Pakistan, Sadaatullah Khaa heads its POK unit. Longtime leader of the 
group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February 2000 stepped down as HUM amir, turning the 
reins over to the popular Kashmiri commander and his second in command, Farooq 
Kashmiri. Khalil, who has been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February 1998 
calling for attacks on US and Western interests, assumed the position of HUM Secretary 
General. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition 
airstrikes destroyed them during fall 2001. 
The Chain of command is 
Maulana Fazlul Rehman Khalil of Dera Ismail Khan (Pakistan) - Amir-e-Aala. 
Maulana Abdula Jabbar Wasmi of Dera Gazi Khan (Sahiwal, Pakistan) Naib Amir. 
Farooq Kashmiri of Rawlakote (POK) Commander in Chief 
69 
Mufti Asghar of Bagh (POK) Launching chief. 
Salahudin alias Salar of Gujarat chief in India. 
Tasleem of Muzaffanagar -U.P. Deputy chief in India, 
Nayeem Khalid alias SonauUah of Karachi- J&K chief (reportedly dead). 
Azam Kashmiri alias Zahoor Ahmad Dar ,Nawakadal, Srinagar- J.K No 2. 
Jehangir of Miijanpur, Srinagar -District commander, city. 
Its recruiting, training and launching centres are at Athmuqam, Kel Sector, 
Sahiwal, Bahawalpur, Faisalabad,'Maskar Khaliddin Walid, Kotli and Maskar Kotli. 
The HA main office is located at Lahore, (192, 9/9 Sham Nagar Road, Main 
Burji Chowk). Its other offices are at 379, Sector 1, Pindora, Chungi, Islamabad; 247; Huma 
Block, Kali Kothi, Iqbal Town, Lahore; 159-G, Masjid Chowk, Opposite Eddy Centre, 
Defence Society, Lahore Cantt; Lai Masjid, Begumpura, Lahore; House No. 1, Gali 1, Aftab 
Park, Shezan Factory, Bund Road, Lahore; and Daftar, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Ali Akbar Awan 
High School, Upper Chattar, MuzafTarabad. 
It Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic states and 
from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The HUM's fmancial collection methods also include 
soliciting donations from magazine ads and pamphlets. The sources and amount of HUM's 
military ftmding are unknown. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, 
the HUM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such 
ascommodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods. Its fundraising in 
Pakistan has been constrained since the government clampdown on extremist groups and 
freezing of terrorist assets. The HA relied on donations from rich Pakistanis and collections 
from abroad — West Asia, the UK and the USA, the Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic 
Countries. It also published appeals for donations in its magazine Sada-e-Mujahid. The 
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modus operandi of sending funds to Kashmir was either through militants working as 
couriers or hawala channels. Besides funds from within Pakistan and abroad, the ISI 
remained a major financier of the HA. It maintained the following bank account in Pakistan: 
HuA J&K Moh. Farooq Kashmiri, Current A/c No. 2904-7, Allied Bank of Pakistan, Civil 
Centre Branch, Islamabad^ 
Like all other terrorist organisations this organisation also suffers from inter 
and intra organisational conflicts. The formation of the Jaish-e-Mohammad outfit by Maulana 
Masood Azhar led to serious differences among the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen leadership. Some 
of the HM leaders Mufti Mohd Asghar, Sajid Jehadi, Gazi Baba, Maulana Jabbar, Maulana 
Zafar and Maulana Umar (operational commander in Poonch) left the HM and joined the JM. 
Many terrorists of one organization are also members of another terrorist 
groups. A terrorist organisation may have many groups and sub-groups. Al-Faran was a 
branch of Harkat-ul-Ansar about which nothing more was heard after the kidnapping of the 
foreign tourists That is tilie reason why, according to police officers, it is very difficult to 
form a clear cut listing of terrorists according to their group. The most fundamental division 
is those who favour accession to Pakistan and others which favour complete independence of 
Kashmir or pro-azadi elements. Initially JKLF was supported by Pakistan but when they 
realised that they were talking too much about independence, Zia floated in Hizbul 
Muzahideen. In Kashmir even today a lot of rivahy exists among groups. During the 
Amamath Yatra of 1994 the Hizbul Mujahideen, Allah Tigers, APHC, Jamaat-e-Islami and 
JKLF all lifted the ban and appealed to the Harkat-ul-Ansar to do the same. These appeals 
refused to evoke a positive response . The attack failed and the Ansars suffererd heavy 
casualties. The ban could not be successful as other militant oranisations opposed the ban. 
Kanti Bajpai feels that the hijacking was part of some inter group compititiveness. By 
doing this, the Haricat-ul-Mujahideen wanted more publicity. They wanted to draw attention 
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to their group. Publicity matters because that would persuade elements in Pakistan that this 
is the group to fund. They would want to project thdnselves as the most effective group in 
the struggle. It would cause militants working in other organisations to switch over to them. 
Publicity for the Kashmiri cause, publicity against the Indian government. Publicity of 
themsleves - hijackers were probably aiming for these things. The Pakistanis have probably 
realised that to cany forward the. Kashmir movement they need one dominant group which 
carries out massive insurgency systematically. The question is which group. Perhaps, this 
incident is part of that strategy.'* 
Intelligence officials monitoring the Srinagar and Ganderbal operations of the 
Harkat-ul-Ansar, suggest that the group simply cannot afford to send back its Pakistani and 
Afghan cadres because of the difficulty in bringing in new recruits from abroad. The Srinagar 
chief commander of the Harkat-ul-Ansar, Bilal Ahmad Sheikh, is now believed to command 
30 active personnel, half of them foreigners. By contrast, the Harkat-ul-Jihad unit, which he 
commanded in 1990, had over 300 active members. Given that 15 foreign terrorists were 
killed in and around Srinagar in the same year, the manpower shortage the Harkat-ul-Ansar 
faces is evident. Local recruitment has been almost non-existent in recent years, and this is a 
key factor that led terrorist groups to ship in Pakistanis and Afghans since 1993. 
The unforgiving fundamentalism of the Harkat-ul-Ansar and the Lashkar-e-
Toiba often leads them to conflict with Kashmir's syncretic religious traditions. Although the 
Jamaat-e-Islami and the Hizbul Mujahideen also reject Kashmir's popular religious traditions, 
including the worship of the Moe-e-Muqaddas at Hazratbal, sensitivity to ground reality has 
prevented local operatives from interfering with these practices. By contrast, madrassa-
educated Pakistani and Afghan recruits are often dismissive of local custom. The 
endorsement of Afghan terrorists operating in Kashmir by All-Party Hurriyat Conference 
leader Abdul Ghani Lone in October, for example, led to howls of protest from mainstream 
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and pro-indepen(|ence groupings, which are appalled over the Taliban's patently illiberal 
politics. 
It is in this context that security officials in Kashmir are dismissive about 
claims of massive Taliban entry into Kashmir. "I estimate that there are perhaps a maximum 
of 500 foreign terrorists in Kashmir today," say some sofficers in the field. "If there has been 
an escalation in violence, it is not because their numbers have increased, but because they are 
desperate to make their presence felt." 
The Harkat first came into limelight in Kashmir v^hen it banned the Amamath 
Yatra in 1993 in retaliation to the demolition of Babri Masjid.It wanted the reconstruction of 
the mosque and wanted other closed mosques to be reopened. 
The group again made news when it kidnapped two Britons David Mackie and 
Kim Housego from Aroo,Pahalgam on June 6, 1994 & was also suspected so be involved in 
the abduction of five western tourists in July 1995 allegedly by masquerading as Al Faran. 
The two Britons were released unhurt after the intervention of Mirwaiz of south Kashmir, the 
late Qazi Nisar. However the Harkat denied any role in the abduction of these western 
tourists. One escaped Norwegian national was beheaded while the police announced that 
DNA tests had confirmed that a body exhumed in South Kashmir m 1997 was of Paul Wells 
who also was among the tourists abducted. The fate of the other two remains unknown.. The 
link between such groups became clear when the c£^tors signalled their willingness to free 
the hostages on the condition that 15 political prisoners, held by the Indian authorities, were 
also released. Three of those named Sajad Ahmad, Masud Azhar and Khan Mohammad 
were HUA leaders.^ The police claim that Azhar sneaked into India, on a Portugese 
passport identifying himself as Issa Wali Adam .Azhar had flown from London to New Delhi 
via Bangladesh and entered Kashmir on Feburary 9, 1994. Bom in an affluent family of 
Bhawalpur in Pakistan on July. 10, 1968, his" father is a retired school teacher. Azhar had 
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been editing Sada-e-Mujahaeed, a magazine committed to spread of Islamic teachings. He 
had joined Harkat to raise funds for the group and also to enrol people for Jehad. He was 
rated as a strong motivator and orator. According to the interviewed intelligence officers, he 
came to India in January 1994 and checked into hotel Ashoka and then into a hotel at 
Janpatii in New Delhi. He had visa for India, Pakistan& Bangladesh. He visited Deoband in 
U.P. on Januray 29 accompanied by Ashraf Dar & Abu Mehmood. He then returned to his 
hotel in £)elhi & left for Nadwa, on Feburary 9 & caught the flight to Srinagar along with Dar 
to begin his assignment. His description is meduim height, shallow complexion, strong built, 
round face, protuding belly, eyebrows joined, thick lips, keeps a maulvi beard. 
After passing the eighth standard examination in 1989, he completed the 
Almia examination from the Jamia Islamia. Later he joined the university as a teacher and 
worked there till 1992. He was a follower of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the 
anti-Iran and anti-Shia organization Sipah-i-Sahaba, who was killed in 1990. He was arrested 
along with senior Harkat conunander Sajjad Afghani who was at that time heading HUA 
group in Kashmir. The duo were booked under TADA (FIRl/9) in the police station (counter 
intelligence) Kashmir. But police soucers believe that two months before his arest, Azhar had 
reorganised the two factions as Harkat-ul-Ansar to boost recruitment of local youth said a 
senior security forces officer who had been one of Azhar's interrogators. Sources in the 
security agencies claim that these Harkat recruits were imparted arms training in Yawar camp 
in Khost provrice in Afghanistan. This camp was said to be run by the Afghan Mujahideen 
group Hizbe-Islami (Yunis/ Khalid) faction. Before the Yawar camp the outfit has already set 
up another training camp in Allaq-e-Gare (Fiza) area, sources said. After his release, Masood 
Azhar wished to revive the legacy of his master. By this time Harkat had become a major 
Deobandi organization in Pakistan. Its main strength remained the militants of Punjab who 
not long ago had been the militants of Sipah-i-Sahaba 
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His return therefore caused an upheaval which climaxed in a grand split in the 
Harkat. The split was soon followed by the assassination of Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi, a key 
figure in the Deobandi movement because of his status as a spiritual guide to two important 
Deobandi leaders, his Khalifas: Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI and Maulana Azam Tariq of 
Sipah-i- Sahaba. 
Their Deobandi cotmection with Mullah Omar, the Amir of Afghanistan, 
strengthened theii* presence in Pakistan, especially in Karachi where Binuri Masjid emerged 
as the big centre of the Pakistani Taliban. The Binuri Town complex of the Deobandi 
seminary was headed by Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai who was also a member of the Majlis-i-
Shoora of JUI under Maulana Fazlur Rehman. According to a police officer, who has been 
questioning the arrested Harkat militants for years now, this fundamentalist pan islamic 
outfit is extremely selective in choosing recruits, who are generally taken from theological 
schools worldwide to ensure a high level of motivation for jehad. Harkats strategy has three 
cardinal components - Tableeg (religions discourse). Publicity & Jehad (Holy war) to achieve 
its pan Islamic ambitions. The officer admits that being cadre based, the foreign militants 
dominated Harkat and Lashkar have more conviction than other groups. 
Post Kargil, Lashkar and Harkat have changed tfie tactics from hit-and-run to 
openly attacking military camps. Though Islam forbids sucide , these' fidayen' missions are 
virtually sucide attacks .In fact , lost in the blaze of hijack publicity , was the Harkat 
audacious occupation of the Srinagar headquarters of Jammu and Kashmir police special 
operations group. Some ISO police men were trapped, a deputy superintendent and seven 
other ranks were killed, and the desperados were overpowered only after a 24-hour gunfight. 
In 1996, Harkat-ul- Ansar was a powerful Deobandi militia fighting in Held 
Kashmir. Its activities were so violent that the US declared it a terrorist organization. 
Thereafter a split occurred in it and the two factions that emerged abandoned the old name. 
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Harkat-uI-Mujahideen under Fazlur Rehman Khalil emerged as a big 
organization, while Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami, led by Saifiillah Akhtar, failed to widen its 
influence. One reason was the involvement of Saifullah Akhtar in the unsuccessful rebellion 
by a section of army ofdcers' led by Major-General Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi and Major 
Mustansir Billah in 1995. Saifullah Akhtar saved himself by turning state witness. 
The split in Harkat-ul-Mujahideen: The split was caused by the militants in 
Punjab. Masood Azhar and his Punjabi following isolated the Haricat leader Fazlur Rehman 
Khalil. The formation of Jaish-i-Muhammad as a new organization was aimounced in January 
2000, but Masood Azhar and Fazlur Rehman Khalil began to fight over the Harkat assets. 
On 19 March 2000, the two submitted to a hakam (arbitration) of their elders. 
Harkat was represented by Muhammad Farooq Kashmiri and Jaish was represented by 
Maulana Abdul Jabbar (a key figure in the Kathmandu hijack) on the pledge given that they 
would abide by hakam. The verdict was given by three elders: Mufli Rasheed Ahmed of 
Zarb-i-Momin Jihadi militia, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of the Binuri Town complex and Dr 
Sher Ali Shah of Waziristan. The decision was that all offices of the Harkat, occupied by 
Jaish in Punjab, would be returned to the Harkat, which in turn would pay the Jaish Rs 40 
lakh as its share of the division of assets. 
l l ie implementation of the hakam, however, was not so smooth. The vehicles 
and offices returned by Jaish to Harkat were in such bad repair that Harkat reftised to accept 
tfiem and thus also refused to pay the stipulated 40 lakhs. Meanwhile, in the field, the splinter 
groups fell upon each other. At Ath Maqam in Kashmir members of Harkat suffered serious 
injuries in ambush by the Jaish .^ 
In tiie following month, Jaish was also involved in the alleged killing of a 
Harkat militant in Kabul' which led to a case of qisas being registered in the Taliban court. 
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Despite summons, the leaders of Jaish did not appear in court to defend their 
militants. 
Meanwhile, another rumour reached Lahore about a serious incident caused by 
Jaish and Lashkar militants in Kabul. Six members of the Jaish were found guilty by a 
Taliban coiut of tiie rape and murder of a Shia family and were executed. This news was 
never confirmed but the upshot was that the Taliban authorities closed the Reshkhor camp 
and banished Jaish and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants from Afghanistan. 
The Jaish and Mullah Omar: In Pakistan the Jaish emerged as the more radical 
and more sectarian part of the Harkat because of its Sipah-i-Sahaba background. Maulana 
Yusuf Ludhianvi, it is said, inclined to their creed more than to Harkat's moderate view. 
Mufti Shamzid seemed to vacillate between the two splinter groups, thus allowing the 
Harkaf s over-all leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil to be eclipsed. 
Finding himself thus isolated, Khalil is said to have gone to Osama bin Laden 
and made up some of his losses by getting from him 12 new double-cabin pick-ups trucks to 
replace those ruined by the Jaish in Punjab. It is said that the split in the old Harkat-ul 
Mujahideen was so deep that Maulana Fazlur Rehman did not find himself in a position to 
prevent armed clashes between them. 
Meanwhile the image of Masood Azhar was greatly enhanced in Punjab when 
he was allowed to travel to Lahore with scores of Kalashnikov-bearing guards. The agencies 
restrained him only when his statements against the Musharraf government became too 
aggressive. Meanwhile Pakistan's pressure on the Taliban to surrender Pakistani terrorists 
coincided with die Taliban's own decision to banish Lashkjff-e-Jhangvi and Jaish from 
Afghanistan. 
RoleofU.S.A. ; \ No ' •' 
It was after tf\e notification made to the United States Congre^ (inHiQtober 1,1^57 oy 
Mrs Madeleine Albright ,the U.S Secretary of state listing 30 organisations '^ ^^wteifiational 
terrorist organisations that the US Government to bring under the purview of the Anti-, . 
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 1996, which makes it an offence for any citizen 
or resident of the US to provide funds or other assistance to such organisations. The Act also 
empowers the US AdministraticHi to deny visas to members of such organisations and 
prohibits their representatives from operating from US territory. The HUA was also one of 
these 30 organisations. The report of the US State Department on "Patterns of Global 
Terrorism" during 1994, submitted to the US Congress in April, 1995, for the first time took 
note of the activities of the HUM (HUA) in the following words: "The HUA raised its 
visibility (during 1994) by kidnapping two British citizens (in India) in June. This group has 
recently carried out a number of operations against Indian groups and civilian targets in 
Kashmir. The HUA captured Lt.Col. Bhupinder Singh in January and demanded that Indian 
forces turn over an HUA commander in return for Singh's release. When the Indian 
autfiorities refused, the militants killed Singh. In mid-May, HUA militants conducted two 
attacks in Doda district in which they stopped buses, forced the passengers off, then singled 
out individuals for execution the last victim was a 14-year-old Muslim boy." 
These report added: "The HUA has several thousand armed members located 
in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and in the southern Kashmir valley and Doda regions of India. 
The HUA uses light and heavy machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives and rockets. 
Membership is open to all who support the HUA's objectives and are willing to take the 
group's 40-day training course. It has a core o i^litant group of about 300, mostly Pakistanis 
and Kashmiris, but includes Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. The HUA is 
based in MuzafTarabad, Pakistan, but its members have participated in insurgent and terrorist 
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operations in Kashmir, Burma, Tajikistan and Bosnia. The HUA's Burma branch, located in 
the Arakans, trains local Muslims in weapons handling and guerilla warfare. In Tajikistan, 
HUA members have served witii and trained Tajik resistance elements. The first group of 
HUA militants entered Bosnia in 1992. The source and amount of HUA's military funding 
are unknown, but are believed to come fi-om sympathetic Arab countries and wealthy 
Pakistanis and Kashmiris." 
The State Department's reports for 1995 and 1996 continued to bring on 
record the terrorist activities of the HUA. What the state department's report did not add was 
the fact that it was the CIA which issued Stinger missiles to them and trained them in their 
use for bringing down Soviet planes and helicopters. 
After the collapse of the NajibuUah Government in April 1992, the CIA 
wanted the HUM and other Mujahideen groups to return the unused Stinger missiles for 
which it offered handsome payments. It also asked the ISI to pressurise these groups to return 
the unused missiles. They refiised and LtGen.Nasir allegedly did not co-operate with the CIA 
in getting them back. This was one of the reasons for the CIA's anger against him and 
against the HUM. 
It demanded and obtained in 1993 the removal of Lt.Gen.Nasir and in August, 
1998, when the Cruise missiles attacked the suspected infi-astructure of bin Laden in 
Afghanistan, the HUM training camps came in for focussed attack, apparently to teach the 
HUM leaders a lesson for double-crossing the CIA by not returning the unused Stinger 
missiles. The HUM was the largest recipient of these missiles before 1992. 
The State Department's report for 1997 released in April, 1998, said that there 
continued to be credible reports of official Pakistani support for the Kashmiri extremist 
groups such as the HUM. 
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It added: "Muslims from around the world, including a large number of 
Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians and Saudis continued to use Afghanistan as a training 
ground. The Taliban as well as many otiier combatants in the Afghan civil war facilitated the 
training and the indoctrination facilities for the non-Afghans in the territories they controlled. 
Several Afghan factions also provided logistic support, free passage and sometimes passports 
to the members of the various terrorist organisations." 
It fruther said: "These individuals, in turn, were involved in fighting in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, the Philippines and parts of the Middle 
East." 
Addressing a press conference at Islamabad on August 22,1998, after the US 
bombing of the HUM training camps in Afghanistan, Fazlur Rahman Khalil denied that bin 
Laden was indulging in terrorism and accused the US of killing 50 innocent civilians, 
including IS Arabs. 
He said that the camps bombed by the US in Afghan territory had actually 
been set up by the CIA during the Afghan war and claimed that these were being used by the 
HUM for giving education to the Afghans. He denied that any training in terrorism was going 
on in these camps. 
He alleged that the Nawaz Sharif Government was privy to the bombing and 
said that 40 Cruise missiles had struck three HUM camps in Afghan territory. 
He then warned: " The USA has proved itself to be the world's biggest 
terrorist by carrying out the attacks on Afghanistan and the Sudan atid I want to convey to the 
US leadership that we will take revenge for the attack." 
The US attacked the following HUM camps: 
(a). Ilie Salman Fasi camp situated in Jawah, two kms inside Afghan territory from 
the Pakistani border post of Saidgai. This camp was initially started in the 1980s by the 
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Hizbul Mujahideen of Kashmir with the help of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) of Pakistan. 
Angered over the JI's support to GulbuddinHeckmatyar, the Taliban expelled the Hizbul 
Mujahideen from the Afghan territory and handed over the camp to the HUM, which re-
named it as the Hazrat Amir Mawia camp. When the HUA changed its name as HUM 
after the US notification branding the HUA as an international terrorist organisation, 
some members of the HUA, having differences with the HUM Amir, set up a splinter 
group called the Jamaitul Mujahideen under Mufti Bashir. Tliey have their own training 
camp in the same area. 
(b) The Khalid bin Waleed camp in the Zhavar area near the Pakistan border: Seven 
HUM members, including Abu Huraira, an instructor, were killed. 
(c) The Liza camp at Tanai in the Khost area, 40 kms to the West of the Mawia camp. 
This was run by another HUM splinter group called the Harkat Jehad Islami under 
one Qari Saiful Islam Akhtar. 
(d). Another camp close to the Darwanta hydel power station near Jalalabad. This camp 
originally belonged to Heckmatyar's Hizbe Islami. The Taliban captured it in 
September 1996, and handed it over to the HUM. 
Addressing the Karachi Press Club on August 23,1998, Azizur Rahman 
Danish, the head of the Sindh branch of tfie HUM, warned: "The US air strikes have drawn a 
clear dividing line between the Muslim Ummah and non-believers and this is the beginning 
of a crusade. The USA will be paid back in the same coin." 
Addressing a press conference at Peshawar on August 25, 1998, Fazlur 
Rahman Khalil said that nine HUM members died in the US attack on its camps in the Khost 
area, of whom five were killed oh the spot and the remaining succumbed to their injuries in 
Pakistani hospitals. In addition, two Tajiks and four Arabs, two of them physically 
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handicapped, were also killed. According to him, the Cruise missiles destroyed four mosques, 
partially damaged another and burnt 200 copies of the Holy Quran kept in the camps. 
He added: "TTie USA calls Osama a terrorist and President Clinton is claiming 
that all terrorist training camps had been destroyed in the air strikes. Let me tell the 
Americans that not even one per cent of the so-called terrorist camps run by Osama have 
been destroyed." 
In another warning to the US on September 1,1998, Fazlur Rahman Khalil 
said: "The USA has struck us with Tomahawk Cruise missiles at only two places, but we will 
hit back at them everywhere in the world, wherever we find them. We have started a holy war 
against the US and they will hardly find a tree to take shelter beneath it." 
Khalid Ahmed, a well-known Pakistani analyst, wrote as follows in the issue 
of the "Friday Times", a Pakistani weekly, for the week fi-om August 28 to September 
3,1998: "The national consensus on Kashmir often blinds Pakistan to the isolationist 
compulsions that arise fi-om it. Internal politics has compelled the removal of Heckmatyar's 
Hizbe Islami from the Afghan jehad and his ally Qazi Hussain Ahamad's Hizbul Mujahideen 
from the Kashmir jehad. The vacuum created by their ouster has been filled exclusively with 
Deobandi and Wahabi Mujahideen. 
"The Deobandi HUA and the Wahabi Lashkar-e-Toiba are the main outfits 
fighting in Kashmir, but their guerilla training is acquired in Afghanistan. ..That the jehad in 
Kashmir is dependent on the Afghan jehad is hidden from no one. That it gives a locus standi 
to India in Afghanistan is not clear to most Pakistanis. The Pakistani compulsion to wage the 
Kashmiri jehad with the help of Deobandi-Wahabi warriors has allowed anew religious 
stringency to prevail in Pakistani society." 
He added: "In 1996, the Lahore High Court openly favouterf the Wahabi 
jurisprudence as some of the judges were found to be of Ahle Hadith peWJHSm Prime 
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Ministers and Presidents have been attending Deobandi congregations to demonstrate their 
new faith. Violent sectarianism is the offshoot of this social change." 
In an editorial in the issue for the week from August 14 to 20, 1998, the same 
journal warned: " Pakistan is gradually falling under the puritanical faith of Deobandi-
Wahabi forces that are allied to the Taliban. In the past two years, for example, Pakistani 
judges are increasingly falling prey to Islamic extremism....The Pakistani state will become 
hostage to tibie Taliban E)eobandi brand of Islam by continumg to give succour to the Jamiat 
Ulema Islam, the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the HUM." 
In an article in the same issue, Ejaz Haider, another Pakistani analyst, said: "A 
recent report brought out the linkage between Deobandi sectarian organisations in Pakistan 
and the HUA which has links both with the Taliban and the JUL" It said that Imams 
belonging to these organisations have been saying in their addresses to their congregations 
that after consolidating its hold in Afghanistan, the Taliban would not only "liberate" 
Kashmir, but also rid Pakistan of Shias and Brelvi Sunnis. 
The HUM has strongly opposed the process for the normalisation of Indo-
Pakistani relations. In a statement before the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Atal 
Behari Vajpayee, to Lahore for talks with Nawaz Sharif, Fazlur Rahman Khalil warned: 
"More bodies of Indian officials would be sent in coffins from Kashmir on the days Vajpayee 
visits Lahore." He also said that Islam's enemity with India was ideological and not just 
territorial. He alleged that it was the US which had pressurised the two Prime Ministers to 
meet. 
The Markaz and its Lashkar and the HUM are determined to wreck the 
normalisation process by stepping up their terrorist activities against India. 
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ROLE OF PAKISTAN 
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A covert campaign to introduce fundamentalist Islam to alienate Kashmiri 
Muslims and create a communal divide between Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims, has been 
successfully conducted by Pakistan in Kashmir for over two decades Muslims were urged to 
overthrow the regime and demand independence. All material and military assistance was 
provided to Kashmir militants by Pakistan. The term azadi was deliberately kept vague to 
deceive the Kashmiri Muslims. The Pakistani term azadi connotes independence from India 
and merger with Pakistan, not an independent Kashmir. The JKLF, which campaigned for an 
independent status for Kashmir, was gradually sidelined and various Pakistani militant groups 
took over the movement to conduct a military and religious campaign on the model of 
Afghan insurgents. 
Fundamentalist groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-uI-Ansar, Lashkar-
e-Taiba, Harkat-e-Mujahi-deen launched violent campaigns against the state government and 
central agenciesKashmiriat was under attack and the so called jehad was directed mainly 
against democratic norms and liberal values ingrained in Kashmiri culture. 
Pakistan is responsible for the training of most of the Kashmiri separatist 
groups in camps located in Pakistani Kashmir. The ISI, i.e. the Pakistani military intelligence 
service, arms and finances the separatist groups operating within Indian Kashmir and often 
defines their strategy. 
"The ISI opted to keep the US/CIA out of the camps in order to hide the extent 
of the 'volunteer's' training programme. Indeed, thousands of Islamist trainees from Indian 
Kashmir, and to a lesser extent Sikhs fi-om the Punjab, as well as hundreds of Islamists from 
all over the Arab and Muslim world, were routinely trained in camps originally set up strictly 
for die training of Afghan Mujahideen'. 
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ISI's Guidelines for Terrorism 
The aim of the Pakistan authorities to destabilise and break the Indian nation 
has been entrusted to the Pakistan Intelligence agencies particularly the ISI. It has been 
reliably learnt that Pakistan ISID has laid down the following guidelines to gear up terrorism 
in the Kashmir valley and Punjab :^ 
1- All trained Kashmiri/Sikh youth in Pak/POK to be infiltrated to Kashmir as soon as 
possible. 
2- All arms earmarked for the terrorists are to be dispatched to the Kashmir 
valley/Punjab through secret routes. 
3. Terrorist movement in Kashmir and Punjab should be kept alive and efforts made to 
spread it to Ladakh, UP, Delhi, Bengal(East India), Kamataka (South India), etc. 
4. Maximum training camps to be opened. The location of these camps should be 
selected by respective militant outfits which would be surveyed and ^proved by a 
team of ISID and will be run under their close supervision. Afghan Mujahideen 
instructors would also be made available for training in these camps. 
5. More Afghan Mujahideen to be sent to the valley. 
6. ISI will control all militant outfits operating in the valley. 
7. The Plan envisaged by the Indian government to hold elections in Jammu and 
Kashmir to be sabotaged. 
8. Kashmiri leaders supporting elections in Jammu and Kashmir to be 
eliminated/kidnapped. 
9. To kill Hindus in Punjab so that members of this community migrate out of Punjab 
and Sikhs migrate to Punjab after a Hindu backlash. 
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Since the summer of 1991, the ISI has further increased its direct involvement 
in the training and supporting of Kashmiri Islamist terrorists. Brig. Mohammed Salim, an ISI 
Officer, is in charge of training and supporting Kashmiri Islamists. 
By 1992, the ISI was operating 13 permanent, 18 temporary, and 8 joint 
training camps for Kashmiris in Pakistan Azad Kashmir alone. Some 3,700 Kashmiri fighters 
were located in those camps by the sunmier of 1992, including terrorists who crossover from 
Indian Kashmir. 
TTius, in ttie spring of summer of 1992, the ISI established new training camps 
for Islamist terrorists where they are trained on the latest weapons. The Director of this effort 
is ISI Brig. Javed, a veteran of the Afghan support effort. A special research council of 
Islamabad, including military and ISI officers, determines which groups and individuals are 
eligible to receive assistance, what type, and to what extent. 
"Curriculum in Training Camps^" 
Elementary Training for 7 to 10 days 
1. Introduction to AK-47 Rifles, Chinese Pistols, Rocket Launchers/LMG's Explosives 
2. Art of Ambushes with minimum firing practice on AK-47 Rifles and pistols plus live 
demonstration of Explosives 
3. Lectures and practical demonstrations in concealment, camouflage, reconnaissance, 
and intelligence gathering 
4. Others sent for "battle inocculation in Afghan Mujahideen War" 
5. Training in sabotage and subversive operations 
6. Indoctrination for armed struggle through lectures and video films Extended 
Training Cmirses 2 to 12 weeks 
1. Handling of sophisticated/heavy weapons, including Rocket Launchers, 
MMG's/LMG's, AK-47/56/74's 
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2. Ml/Sniper rifles, Mortars, Remote Control devices 
3. Anti-personnel/tank mines and explosives, including lED's 
4. Finer aspects of Ambushes/Raids, operation of walkie-talkie sets 
5. Use of anti-Aircraft guns and Heavy Machine Guns 
6. Rock climbing/Mountaineering, Jungle survival. Mock exercise for border crossing. 
7. First aid/para-medical training 
8. Audio-Visual education on commando operations 
9. After initial arms training, some terrorists are imparted Wireless communication 
training (Morse and computer-based data mode) for ensuring direct link of terrorists 
with Pakistan Authorities. 
10. Specialised training in new weapons including SVD, E)ragunov sniper rifles, 12.7 mm 
Heavy machine guns and 82 mm Mortars. 
Revised Curriculum 
In selected cases training programs have now been streamlined and extended 
to periods ranging between 6 months to 1 year. Emphasis is now being laid on building up 
tough physical standards and development of leadership qualities. Educated youth, preferably 
with technical/science background, and affiliated to pro-Pak groups are being selected for 
specialised and prolonged training. In his book, Kashmir, Pakistan's Proxy War, D.P.Kumar 
writes that ISI has 25,000 agents who work in six departments which are :-
Joint Intelligence X, Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau, Joint Intelligence 
North, Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous and Joint Signal Intelligence. It's yearly expenditure 
is 160 crores which is collected through smuggling of narcotics. To finance terrorist 
operations in India, advertisements are printed in Pakistani newspapers and donations are 
demanded fix)m the people in the name of Jehad. The donations are deposited in "Faizal Bank 
Ltd. - 43 Kaide Azme Road, Lahore" in account No 201186001. Besides these , the Islamic 
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Development Bank and Habib Bank bear the expenditure of terrorist bases running in India in 
the guise of Islamic Madersaa. Even after all this if more money is needed then the banned 
Pakistani bank - Bank of Conmierce and Credit International prints fake Indian and 
American currency. Thus the ISI is completely autonomous in running and it's operations 
does not afTect the finances of Pakistan. 
Even the money received as "zakat" — a kind of religious tax which Islam 
enjoins upon a certain category of the believers for the welfare of the needy — is used to fund 
tfiis nefarious scheme. 
If the ISI has its own funds earmarked for the dirty game, the militant outfits 
operating from both sides of the border have set up Aeir front organisations for collecting 
money to pay the "mujahideen" engaged in "jehad". The most dependable from the ISI's point 
of view network is being run by the Hurriyat The Jamaat has set up a memorial trust to 
attract donations mainly fix)m abroad. The Markaz al-Dawah has its headquarters at Lahore 
and collects huge sums to fight the so-called "holy war" in Kashmir. 
Surprisingly, militants are not the only people to benefit from these funds 
received mainly as donations. Certain politicians too have had their share. However, 
donations are not enou^ to lubricate the proxy war. There are certain other ways also to 
ensure an uninterrupted supply of money. These include: (1) sale of narcotics on a large scale 
(the United Nations Drug Control Programme has it that the ISI annually makes around $ 2.5 
billion through this source and it must be spending anything between Rs S37.S crore and Rs 
1,075 crore on fuelling militancy every year); (2) printing of fake currency notes by the 
National Jehad Council at its printing press at Muzaffarabad in occupied Kashmir; (3) 
collections made in West Asia and European countries for the Jehad Fund; and (4) extortions 
from traders, contractors and other moneyed people. 
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Money from foreign sources is received through the hawala route. There is 
also a system of indirect funding providing arms, ammunition, food and clothing to militants 
before pushing them on to this side of the India-Pakistan divide. It is ensured that before 
entering the valley tiie militants carry with them large amounts of cash (both Indian and 
Pakistani currency). 
In fact, militancy has become a flourishing business. The recruits get either a 
fixed salary or v^ ork on a contract basis. According to information available, a local militant's 
monthly salary varies between Rs 2,500 and Rs 5,000 depending on various factors. A 
foreign mercenary gets between Rs 5,000 and Rs 8,000. The financial support given to the 
family of a deceased militant ranges from Rs 1500 to Rs 3000 a month. A fresh recruit can 
secure anything between Rs 5,000 and Rs 20,000 as a one-time payment, depending on his 
capacity to bargain. A guide gets between Rs 30,000 and Rs 50,000, a porter between Rs 
7,500 and Rs 20,000 and a motivator Rs 5,000. 
There are other kinds of payments made which show how meticulously the 
whole operation is carried on. A militant gets Rs 150 for throwing a grenade and Rs 6,000 for 
winter clothing. For killing an officer of the security forces up to the rank of Major the 
"reward" is Rs 7,000, for a Lieut-Colonel Rs 50,000 and for a Brigadier and above earns a 
much bigger amount. 
The militants of foreign origin cost ttie ISI a little more. When they enter into 
a two-year contract they are paid Rs 2 lakh to move to Kashmir. When they go back home 
after the contract period they get another Rs 5 lakh as a final payment. 
Now the figures about the year-wise expenditure (these do not include all 
payments made for the execution of the Kashmir plan of the ISI). For carrying out the 
operation from July to September, 1999, the "Supreme Commander" of the Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen received Rs 1,06,50,000. During 1998 the payments made to militants totalled Rs 
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6,94,31,733, and the payees mainly belonged to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-
Toiyaba. 
In 1997, Rs 70,39,473 was distributed and the money went to certain Shia 
militant outfits in the valley. In 1996, the total amount received for militant activity was Rs 
10,50,738. Of tiiis, Rs 5,00,000 reached the People's Conference and Hurriyat leaders. 
In the post-Kargil period militant organisations are getting special treatment to 
keep their morale high. The ISI funding is now more liberal. According to one source, the 
monthly aid to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is at least Rs 1 crore, to the Harkat-ul-Ansar Rs 40 
lakh, to the Al-Barq Rs 12 lakh, to the All-Party Hurriyat Conference Rs 2 crore and other 
groups (minor ones) about Rs 35,000 each. 
There is widespread unemployment and poverty in certain areas of Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and some Muslim-dominated West Asian countries. This helps in recruiting 
youngsters for the destructive scheme, specially when the "salary" is so tempting. Religion 
comes handy in brainwashing the poverty-stricken people to risk their lives for a "cause". 
This is sheer exploitation of simple souls. 
The details are not exhaustive of the ISI's cash transactions (these do not 
include the undetected ones, specially hawala deals and donations). 
Year Amount paid Major recipients 
1996 Rs. 5,00,000 Sent through bank draft for leaders of the People's 
Conference and the APHC. 
sl996 Rs. 5,50,738 Through a draft drawn on a foreign bank in London. 
1997 Rs. 70,39,473 Amount sent for Shia military outfits in the valley. 
1998 Rs. 3,91,733 Channelling of fimds from abroad to militants through a 
Srinagar-based trust. 
Jan Rs. 75,00,000 Paid by the ISI to militant organisations for continuing their 
operations. 
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Jan Rs. 20,00,000 Received by unidentified outfits to intensify militant 
activity. 
Feb Rs. 85,00,000 Amount paid by the ISI to the Commander of the Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen for distribution among militants. 
March Rs. 25,00,000 Amount paid by the Hizb-ul- Mujahideen Supreme 
Commander to its functionaries in Baramula for militant 
activity. 
May Rs. 60,00,000 Paid by the chief of the Hizb -ul - Mujahideen, Syed 
Salahuddin, to the organisation's functionaries through a Delhi-
based courier for militant activity. 
June Rs. 1,00,00,000 Paid to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen functionaries by the ISI for the 
families of killed militants. 
Jime Rs. 50,00,000 Paid to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen functionaries by the ISI for 
being distributed among the families of killed militants. 
Aug Rs. 40,00,000 Paid by the ISI to the Lashkar-e-Taiba to intensify 
militant activity. 
Oct Rs. 1,70,00,000 Paid by the ISI to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen leaders as arrears 
and for the purchase of winter clothing. 
Nov Rs. 15,40,000 Paid by the ISI to the Divisional Commanders of Doda, 
Banihal, Udhampur and Pir Panjal of tiie Hizb-ul-Mujahideen 
for valley-based militants. 
Dec Rs. 50,00,000 Paid by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Supreme Commander to 
valley-based militants. 
1999 
July Rs. 3,50,000 Paid by Hizb-ul-Mujahideen supremo Syed Salahuddin to 
the outfit's Deputy Supreme Commander as operation money 
for August and September. 
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Sep Rs. 1,03,00,000 -do-
Pavments made to militants cmd their sympathisers. 
Local militant Rs. 2,500-5,000 ($ 58-$ 116) per month. 
Foreign militant Rs. 5,000-8,000 ($ 116-$ 186) per month 
Each deceased militant's family Rs. 1,500-3,000 ($ 35-$ 70) per month 
Guide Rs. 30,000-Rs. 50,000 ($ 698-$ 1,163) 
Porter Rs. 7,500 ($ 175) for ammunition box Rs. 20,000 ($ 465) 12-14 kg/trip 
Motivator Rs. 5,000 ($116) per rect. 
Recruit Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 20,000 ($ 116 to $ 465) as one-time payment 
Other payments 
Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 2,00,000 ($ 1,163 to $ 4,651) to deceased militants' families or 
militancy-affected families. 
Rs, 6,000 ($140) forwinter clothing. 
Rs, 150 ($3) for grenade throwing. 
Amount payable as a reward for killing Army/security forces' personnel 
Rs. 7,000 ($163) UptoMajorrankorequivalent 
Rs. 50,000 ($1,163) Lieut-Colonel 
Larger amount Brigadier and above 
Foreign militants get Rs. 2,00,000 ($ 4,651) while coming in and another Rs. 5,00,000 
($ 11,628) on going back after a two-year contract. 
The ISI'sfimd allocations 
Names of organisations Amount paid per month 
Hizbul Muja^'" Rs. 1,00,00,000 ($ 232,558) 
Harkat-ul-Ar Rs. 40,00,000 ($ 93,023) 
Al-Barq Rs. 12,00,000 ($ 27,907) 
93 
All-Party Hurriyat Conference Rs. 20,00,00,000 ($ 4,651,160) 
Minor groups Rs. 35,00,000 ($ 81,395) 
TKe ISI uses drug money to finance the work of about ten fundamentalist 
organisations operating in Kashmir such as Al Umar, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Jehad-ul-Kashmir, 
as well as groups in Tajikistan, Chechnya and Xinjiang'^ . 
In May 1994, in an interview to The Washington Post, Nawaz Sharif himself 
stirred the hornets' nest by claiming that in early 1991 Pakistan's army chief, Gen Aslam Beg 
and head of ISI Gen Asad Durrani wanted his consent for extending direct patronage to 
narco-trafficking. He said the two generals proposed a detailed blueprint for selling heroin to 
pay for the country's military operations. It was three months after Sharif was elected as the 
Prime Minister. They told hiiri. that the armed forces needed more money for covert 
operations and wanted to raise it through large scale drug deals. 
Civilian political leaders have quite often accused the military of developing 
the country's nuclear technology, arming insurgents in India and other countries without their 
knowledge or approval and sometimes in direct violation of civilian orders. The United 
Nations says that as much as 80 percent of heroine in Europe comes from Pakistan. 
List of For^n Mercenaries killed between Jan 1 and Mar 31,1999 
Name 
Babar Gazi 
Samunder Khan 
DR Saifulla 
Mohd Usman 
Nationality 
Karachi, Pakistan 
Palcistan 
Gujaranwala/ 
PaldstanA 
Pal(istan 
Terrorist 
Organization 
Inter Service Intelligence 
Agent 
Hizbul Mujahideen 
Lashl(ar-e-Toiba 
Hart<at-UI-Jehad-e-Islami 
Date Kliied 
05 Jan 99 
11 Jan 99 
12 Jan 99 
15 Jan 99 
District 
Anantnag 
Baramula 
Kupwara 
Baramula 
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Abu Taiab 
Abu Yunus 
Hafaz Abu 
Samail 
Abu Taiha Alias 
Hameed 
Abu Hurun 
Dakhal 
Abu Asam alias 
Mohd Tariq 
Majgora 
Nazir Hazam 
Haider All 
Idris Khan 
Wahadi alias 
Saifullah 
Abu Abdul 
Rehman 
Abu Herts 
Javed Ahmed 
Bhat 
Ul Sbelkh 
Abdul Rehman 
Attaulla Haq 
Gujaranwala, 
Pakistan 
Mirpur, Pakistan 
Mohwalpur, 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Sialkot, Pakistan 
Lahore, Pakistan 
Kasur, Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Kasur, Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Hizbul l^ujahideen 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
Hizbul Mujahideen 
Inter Service Intelligence 
Agent' 
Al Badar 
Inter Service Intelligence 
Agent 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
Harkat-UI-Ansar 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
Al Badar 
16 Jan 99 
19 Jan 99 
19 Jan 99 
19 Jan 99 
19 Jan 99 
19 Jan 99 
21 Jan 99 
01 Feb 99 
01 Feb 99 
01 Feb 99 
03 Feb 99 
06 Feb 99 
19 Feb 99 
19 Feb 99 
19 Feb 99 
Snnagar 
Baramula 
Baramula 
Baramula 
Baramula 
Baramula 
Baramula 
Srinagar 
Srinagar 
Srtnagar 
Badgam 
Anantnag 
Baramula 
Baramula 
Anantnag 
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Salauddin 
Ishfaq Ahmed 
Umar MukhtarA 
Mohd Usman 
Anjuman 
Abu Shaheed 
Abu Wakas 
3ohar Musa 
Ajab Khan 
Haider All 
Abu Mohd 
Aselaery 
Abu Khalid 
Abu Ans Samak 
Abu Ans Jaanbaz 
Abu Zaid 
Hafiz 
Rehman 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Bhawal pur, 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Ai Badar 
Al Badar 
AI Badar 
Harkat-UI-Ansar 
Harkat-Ui-Ansar 
Harkat-Ui-Ansar 
Al Badar 
Al Badar 
Harkat-UI-Mujahideen 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
L3shkar-e-Toiba 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
i^shkar-e-Toiba 
iJshkar-e-Toiba 
Hizbul Mujahideen 
Inter Service Intelligence 
Agent 
19 Feb 99 
19 Feb 99 
22 Feb 99 
04 Mar 99 
09 Mar 99 
09 Mar 99 
13 Mar 99 
13 Mar 99 
14 Mar 99 
16 Mar 99 
16 Mar 99 
16 Mar 99 
16 Mar 99 
16 Mar 99 
16 Mar 99 
17 Mar 99 
Anantnag 
Anantnag 
Kupwara 
Anantnag 
Kupwara 
Kupwara 
Baramula 
Baramula 
Anantnag 
Kupwara 
Kupwara 
Kupwara 
Kupwara 
Kupwara 
Anantnag 
Srinagar 
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Sajjad Ahmed 
Hafeez Mohd 
IjazA 
Punjab, Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Inter Service Inteiligence 
Agent 
iJshkar-e-Toiba 
17 Mar 99 
27 Mar 99 
Srinagar 
Kupwara 
In the history of the Indian civil aviation, there have been 13 hijackings 
(including the latest to Kandahar), all involving the Indian Airlines (lA) aircraft. Seven of 
these were carried out by groups with known links to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) and the other six by groups or mdividuals with no such links. 
In 1992, the Narasimha Rao Government shared with Washington a wealth of 
evidence gathered by the Indian agencies regarding Pakistani State sponsorship of terrorism 
in India and urged that Pakistan should be declared a State sponsor of terrorism under the US 
laws and economic sanctions imposed against it. 
Washington expressed its inability to act on the basis of Indian evidence on the 
ground that most of it was circumstantial and not direct and that much of it was based on 
interrogation reports, which, in the eyes of the US law, are suspect unless independently 
corroborated by documentary or technical evidence. 
After the Mumbai blasts of March, 1993, the Narasimha Rao Govt, decided to 
invite the counter-terrorism experts of the US and other Western countries to visit the spot 
immediately after the blasts and make their own examination of the scene of the crime. The 
idea was that if their experts concluded that Pakistan was behind the blasts, even if they did 
not share this with their Indian counterparts, they would, at least, go back and tell their 
political leadership about it. 
An Austrian expert, who came to India, gave in writing that the hand grenades 
used by the terrorists in Mumbai while escaping after the blasts had been manufactured in an 
ordnance factory of the Pakistan Government with technology and machine tools supplied by 
the Austrian company. 
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The US experts told their Indian counterparts that a timer found with an 
unexploded explosive device looked suspiciously American and wanted to take it to the US 
for examination. They were allowed to do so. Later, they sentto New Delhi an unsigned 
written report (a non paper) that their examination had established that the timer was of US-
origin and was part of a consignment of timers supplied by the US army to Pakistan's. 
The Govt, of India pointed out that this was the clinching corroborative 
evidence, which they had always wanted, and that, therefore, they should not have any further 
difficulty in declaring Pakistan a State-sponsor of terrorism. 
US officials expressed their inability to do so on the ground that there was 
considerable leakage of arms and ammunition and explosives from the Pakistan army stocks 
to smugglers and that the recovery of this timer in Mumbai did not necessarily mean that it 
was given to the terrorists by an official agency of Pakistan. According to them, to declare a 
country as a State sponsor of terrorism, conclusive evidence of the complicity of an official 
agency and kno\yledge, if not approval, of such complicity by the political leadership was 
essential. 
After rejecting the Indian plea, Washington made its own assessment of ISI 
involvement in terrorism in India and forced Mr.Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, to 
remove from the ISI its then Director-General, Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir, and a number of his 
senior officers who, Washington believed, had a role in promoting terrorism. 
While this action was good in so far as it went, it did not help the Government 
of India since their successors continued to organise terrorist acts in Indian territory. The US 
action against the ISI officers, however, resulted in an important change in the ISI's modus 
operandi (MO). 
Previously, the ISI used to interact directly with the Sikh, Kashmiri and other 
terrorist groups from India and run the training camps for them with the help of serving 
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officers. Since then, it has been increasingly using private Islamic terrorist organisations for 
supplying money and equipment to the terrorists in India and for running the training camps 
in Afghan territory, instead of in Pakistani territory. 
Among such organisations used by the ISI are the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen 
(HUM), previously known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar, which was declared by the US as an 
international terrorist organisation in October, 1997, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Al Badr and 
Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. All these organisations are members of bin Laden's 
International Islamic Front (also x:alled the International Islamic !§alvation Front) for Jihad 
Against the US and Israel. 
There is the following strong evidence of the HUM's involvement in the 
Kandahar hijacking: the only phone call claiming responsibility came from an Islamic 
Salvation Front; there were identical names in the lists of prisoners whose release was 
demanded by the phone-caller and by the hijackers; the prisoners, whose release was 
demanded, were Pakistani nationals or of Pakistani origin and belonged to the HUM. 
The involvement of the ISI and the Pakistan army with these organisations and 
particularly the HUM, would be evident from the following: 
These organisations function openly in Pakistan and their annual conventions 
are attended by serving officers of the army and political leaders. They and their leaders 
address press conferences, give interviews and issue statements giving details of their 
terrorist activities in India and other countries. The Army has not taken any action against 
them-not even s^ainst the HUM, which has been declared an international terrorist 
organisation by the US. The investigastion and trial in 1995 by the Benazir Bhutto regime of 
a group of army officers headed by Major-Gen.Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi arrested on a charge 
of planning a coup brought out that all the arrested officers had close links with the HUM. 
Mr.M.H.Askari , the well-known Pakistani columnist, wrote^" It is said that the plotters had 
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close links with the Hizbul Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Ansar, which are known for their 
involvement in international terrorism. It is also said that the arrested officers wanted 
Pakistan to become militarily involved in die Kashmir freedom struggle." It was said that 
during their interrogation the arrested officers also implicated Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then a 
Lt.Gen. and Director-General of Military Operations, but no action was taken against him for 
want of evidence. 
US officials have been repeatedly rejecting Indian evidence of Pakistani 
sponsorship of terrorism as circumstantial and not direct, but in the New York World Trade 
Centre and Oklahoma bombing cases, US courts have ruled that in terrorism-related cases 
conviction could be based purely on circumstantial evidence, if it was strong enough and 
provided a continuous chain of events. 
Excerpts from disclosures by Master Ahsan Dar, Supreme Commander, 
'Muslim Mujahideen': 
He and Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Lone, who were arrested at Jawahar Nagar on 
December 19, 1993 in an Intelligence operation soon after the return of Ahsan Dar from 
Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK), have confumed the continued Pakistan support to the 
militancy in J&K. Ahsan Dar had gone across for the fifth time in July 1993. 
On his last visit (July-December 1993) to POK, he held discussions with Brig. 
Fahad, Col. Raja Sajjad, Col. Somail and Col. Imran, Pakistan ISI officials, who emphasised 
the need for reducing the number of militant outfits and bringing them under existing 
secessionist organisations. They wanted a qualitative upgradation in the attacks on Indian 
Security Forces by induction of highly trained and well-equipped Kashmiri militants/alien 
Muslims mercenaries. To achieve the above, the Pakistan ISI has shifted some training camps 
from Muzafarabad to places on the Pakistan-Afghan border and even inside Pakistan and at 
the same time fixed the mandatory training period of militants at 3 months. During his stay in 
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Pak/POK, Ahsan Dar infiltrated 250 militants of 'Muslim Mujahideen' with liberal quantities 
of arms and ammunition. In addition to ISI officials, Ahsan Dar held discussions with Sardar 
Abdul Qayoom Khan, PM, POK. 
After he was dislodged from the post of Chief Commander, 'Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen', he formed 'Mujahideen-e-Islam' in May 1992 and crossed over to Pakistan in 
August 1992 for seeking Pakistan patronage to the new outfit. He was advised by Pakistan 
ISI officials as also Sardar Abdul Qayoom Khan, PM, POK to merge a few splinter militant 
outfits in the valley with his group and seek patronage of the Muslim Conference. Acting on 
the directives of Pakistan agencies on his return in December 1992, he floated 'Muslim 
Mujahideen' by merging four other outfits. 
Excerpts from disclosures by Mohd. Ramzan, former Chief Commander of 
'Ansur-ul-Mujahideen' 
A Pakistani national fix>m Faisalabad, Pakistan, was apprehended on May 11, 
1994 at Udhampvir, India. He was designated as Chief Conunandet of Ansar-ul-Mujahideen 
in March 1994, when three militant outfits were merged. However, in April 1994, he was 
persuaded to leave the outfit by Mehmood-ul-Hassan. He decided to rejoin his parent outfit 
Markaz Dawat-ul-Arshad (MdA) and left for Delhi on May 11, 1994 to contact his senior 
leaders at Lahore, Pakistan on phone for sending more trained youth and money as directed 
by Shamas-ul-Rehman Afghani, Amir, NDA, in the Valley. 
His induction into Kashmir militancy took place while undergoing religious 
training in 1992 at Faisalabad (Pakistan) when he was elected by MdA. He was trained for a 
month at Maskar-e-Taiba training Centre located at Kunnad, Afghanistan in handling of rifles 
of various types, pistols, anti-aircraft/field guns, BM/Stinger missiles, AP/AT mines and 
explosives and underwent a specialised three month Commando course at Maskar-e-Aksa 
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training centre in Afghanistan with about 200 youths, including 5 Afghans, 5 Filipinos, 12 
Kashmiris and the rest from Pak/POK. 
In May 1993, in a group of 15 he was inducted into the Valley through the 
Gurez sector, Baramulla and brought to Ganderbal area by local activists of 'Lashkar-e-
Tajba' and 'Al Barq'. Before induction, the group was briefed by the leaders of MDA, who 
told them to work in close cooperation with 'Al Barq' while maintaining a separate identity. 
Col. Salim of Pakistani ISI also met them at the 'Al Barq' office, 
Muzaffarabad, POK, from where ^ e group was taken to Keil Army Camp. Besides arms and 
ammunition, two computerised wireless sets, Rs. 2,000 to each member and Rs. 20,000 to 
Abu Dujana, Pakistan national and Group Chief, were issued. 
While in hospital he came in contact with Syed Mahmood-ul-Hassan Qadri, a 
Pakistan trained militant with links with the ISI. The 'Ansar-ul-Mujahideen' had planned a 
series of actions at public places in Delhi with the help of some local criminal elements aimed 
at creating panic before Eid. 
Excerpts fix)m Abdul Samad, son of Abdul Hamid, Jaipur :-
A huge explosive device was planted in Purohitji Ka Katla, one of the most 
crowded placed located in the heart of Jaipur city on March 29,1990 to kill a large number of 
Hindus in this Hindu dominated area with a view to triggering off communal riots in Jaipur 
city under the direction of two Pakistan nationals, Sujauddin, son of Fazluddin Sadique, 
House No. 245 D, Block No. 4, F-B Area, Karachi-38, and Mumtazuddin, son of Fazluddin, 
Karchi (Tel. No. 676376/672526 
Atinder Pal Singh, alias Haijeet Singh alias Gurbux Singh alias Virji alias 
Balbir Singh alias Avtar Singh, son of Trilok Singh, resident of Bhopal, Chief of KLO 
(arrested on October 4,1988): 
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Actively involved in the conspiracy to assassinate the late Prime Minister, 
Indira Gandhi, crossed over to Pakistan in October 1984. After this his stock among the 
Pakistan Intelligence authorities rose and he was taken to different jails where Sikh youth 
were lodged for training and indoctrination. He again visited Pakistan from September to 
November 1987 along with his close associate Sukhdev Singh alias Fauji, an ex-serviceman, 
where they were extensively trained in the handling of explosives and fabrication of 
Improvised Explosive Devices (lEDs). Their training also included blowing up of bridges, 
railway tracks and use of road mines to blow up VIP vehicles. 
Excerpts from Ghulam Rasool Dar, son of Abdul Aziz Dar of Kupwara, Akbar 
Tigers (arrested on November 7,1990):-
A Brigadier of Pakistan Army declared that they had decided to impart special 
training to Kashmiri youths and raise its own battalion to be attached with 655 Mujahid 
Battalion of tiie Pakistan Army to help their men in the Valley at an opportune time. He also 
disclosed that wireless communication facility was being provided by the Pakistan Army so 
that militant outfits in the Valley can maintain contact with the Pakistan Army picked at 
Wahab Dar. 
The following list released by Hizbul Mujahideen^ of its martyrs in the 
Kashmir struggle show the direct involvement of Pakistan nationals in terrorism in Kashmir. 
1. Martyr Manzoor Bhai (Rawalkot), 2. Martyr Dawood Bhai (Azad Kashmir), 3. 
Nazir Kansour alias Assadulla, 4. Martyr Akbar Bhai (Afghanistan), 5. Martyr 
Umar Gazi (SaudiArabia), 6. Martyr Khalid Bhai, 7. Martyr Basharat Abass 
(Azad Kashmir), 8. Martyr Utta-ul-Rehman (Deer), 9. Martyr Basharat Abbas 
(Azad Kashmu'), 10. Martyr Abid alias Akhtar (Rahimyar Khan), 11. Martyr 
Sikander Hayat (Faisalabad), 12. Martyr Mohmeer Khan (Karachi), 13. Martyr 
Rehman Khan (Bardo), 14. Martyr Zulfikar Munshi (Sargoda), 15. Martyr 
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Zulfikar Ahmed (Gujrat), 16. Martyr Umer Niyazi (Gujranwala), 17. Martyr Tariq 
Mohmood (Lahore), 18. Martyr Zafar Bhai (Gujranwala), 19. Martyr Amir Bhai 
(Deer), 20. Martyr Gazi Yousuf (Lahore), 21. Martyr Abu Qasim (Khaniwal), 22. 
Martyr Khalid-ul-Islam (Lahore), 23. Martyr Sher Ali (Sialkot), 24. Martyr 
AssaduUa Bhai (Gazi-Khan), 25. Dawood Afghani (Afghanistan), 26. Sidiq Bhai 
(Afghanistan)(Pakistan), 27. Nawab Khan, Martyr Dilawar Bhai (Lahore), 28. 
Martyr Ali Bhai (Rawalkot), 29. Mir Hamza (Frontier Province), 30. Gazi Yusuf 
(Lahore), 31. Martyr Abu-al-Qasim (Khaniwala), 32. Buder Bhai, 33. Martyr 
AbduUa Bhai (Atak), 34. Martyr Abu Qasim (Lahore), 35. Abdulla Bhai (Saudi 
Arabia), 36. Martyr Abdul Rehman (Bahrain), Hasaan Bhai (Afgani) 
Location of terrorist training camps in Pakistan & Afghanistan. 
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This is according to the march issue of Frontline. The red dots show the location of 
some of the well-documented terrorist camps operating in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied 
Kashmir.The sole red dot in Afghanistan depicts the location of terrorist camps housing 
Pakistani trainees targeted by US missiles 
Some facts on tiie Pakistani terrorist machinery aimed at Kashmir according to 
Washington Post, 
Number of Terrorist Camps in Pakistan: 37 
Number of Terrorist Camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir: 49 
Number of Pakistani-run Terrorist Camps ih Afghanistan: 22 
Total Number of Hardcore Terrorists Operating in Jammu and Kashmir: 2300 
Total Number of Foreign Mercenaries Operating in Jammu and Kashmir: 900 
Number of Pakistani terrorists killed by Indian security forces: 291 
Number of Pakistani terrorists in Indian jails: 125 
Number of Indian civilians killed by Pakistani terrorists: over 29,000 
Number of firearms recovered from Pakistan-trained terrorists in India: 47,000 
Amount of explosives recovered from Pakistan-trained terrorists in India: 60 tons 
(30,000kg) 
Number of explosions carried but by P^istan-trained terrorists in India: 4,730 
Nationalities of Foreign Mercenaries Operating in Jammu and Kashmir: 
Pakistan, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Afghanistan, 
Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, 
Bahrain, Banglacksh, Iran, Iraq 
Deadliest Pakistani Terrorist Groups Active in Jammu and Kashmir: 
Haricat-ul-Ansar (recently renamed Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin) 
Headquarters: MuzafiTarabad (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir) 
Lashkar-e-Toiba 
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Headquarters: Muridke (Pakistan) 
Hizbul Mujahideen 
Peak time of annual infiltration of terrorists into India is the summer months, when the snows 
have melted, under cover of Pakistani Army firing* According to CNN reports, the number 
of people in Jammu and Kashmir killed in violence waged by Pakistan-supported terrorists 
over the last decadeis over 20,000. Over 300,000 Kashmiri Pandits (original Hindu 
inhabitants of Kashmir valley) driven out of their ancestral homeland by Pakistan-supported 
terrorists. The US Tomahawk missiles killed Pakistani terrorists belonging to Harkat-ul-
Ansar in tiie Khost camps in Afghanistan in 1993 . These terrorists were training to fight in 
Kashmir. 
The Harkat-ul-Ansar and the Lashkar-e-Toiba threatened US citizens recently 
in open news conferences in major cities in Pakistan .^ The Pakistani government makes no 
attempt to shut down any of these groups. 
Most recent recruits to Pakistani terrorist camps are Kashmiri Muslim children 
as young as 12 years old, coerced into a dead-end career by Pakistani terrorist groups ^ 
The reason why the Pakistani economy is in shambles is that 70% of its 
budget goes to the military plus its debt payments, much of the military spending being on 
sustaining the Kashmiri terror. 
Some of the ISI agents apprehended in India are: 
Amjad Ali, and Mahfooz Ali both ISI trained Pakistan nationals were arrested 
in Delhi on March 4, 1994. Maj. Sohail Ahmed, PA No. 16742; Capt. Aftab Hussain Shah, 
PSS 21961; N/Sub. Mustaq Ahmed, No. 155492; Sep/Driver Fateh Mohd., No. 3231138. 
Amjad Ali, Mehfooz Ali Khan along with two other Pakistan nationals had been sent to Delhi 
by Major(Retd) Ehsan-ul-Haq, Military Commander of a Lahore-based militant organisation, 
Islami Inquilabi Mahaz. 
A large number of documents, 16 kg of high explosives, seven electronic 
detonators, two hand grenades were among the materials found on them. They also had two 
sets of "Win Word" floppies containing 250 pages that included notes on RDX and TNT, the 
production of explosives and the manufacture of poisons from easily available substances. 
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They had received extensive training Afghani guerilla warfare as well as in 
Kotli and Bagh from ISI instructors. They had been told to establish bases in different cities 
of India and then strike mainly with explosives at railway tracks, bus stands, telephone lines, 
government and commercial buildings. They even intended to poison wells to create panic 
and cripple the economy by damaging the transport and communications system. 
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CONCLUSION 
107 
Terrorism is the work of an organisation. It is a group activity. The size of the 
group binding varies in accordance to the organisation. Once an individual becomes part of 
the group, it does not allow him to leave it. The group could be very close knit with definite 
aims, ideology and a well defined role for every individual, or it could be a loose knit group 
with horizontal bindings and not very clear aims. What is common to all terrorist groups is 
that they all attempt to committ acts which cause 'terror'. They suffer from inter-group and 
intra-group clashes. When this happens, it is a weakness of terrorist's politics. 
As has been seen in die earlier chapters, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Hizbul 
mujahideen have a well knit organisational structure, well defined ideologies, system of 
recruitment and also links with foreign countries. Both these states have a rich culture. In 
chi^ Jter two and diree, we have seen how the culture, value system and institutions in 
Kashmir are being eroded. What is under stress are the emotional ties binding Kashmir to the 
rest of the country. In the process, weakening the basis of a secular, plural and democratic 
politics. 
Though formed as independent organisations, both these groups have a history 
which can be traced back, they also have set ideologies and are highly fundamentalist and 
intolerant towards other religions. 
Membership of both ^e organisations is restricted. Emphasis is on the strength 
of members and not their numbers. Thus the members of these organisations are more 
dedicated, organised and deadly. No member of either group enjoys sovereign power. The 
powers are shared among its various units that operate under a single banner. The powers are 
delegated from one unit to another for transaction or subversion through various units spread 
all over the world. Police Officers talk of tiie difference that exists between the leader and the 
cadres. The leaders it has been observed are more educated, from a better socio-economic 
background and are more ideologically committed. It has been seen that usually, the cadres 
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are from a rural background. Their level of education is not very high and they fall within the 
age group of 20-30 years. 
We looked at Merari's four fold classification in chapter four. Our groups i.e., 
Harkat-ul-Ansar seemed to be coming closer to domestically bom homofighters and foreign 
bom xenofighters very partially. These categories do not fit into the Indian case because of 
State sponsored terrorism. These groups have their funding, training and weapons from the 
foreign state sponsoring terrorism. Secondly, the leadership of these organisations is 
heterogenous. 
Our study suggests that one has to go in for the understanding that terrorism is a 
process in which decision making within the organisation, organisational strength, 
background and size of the group and ideology have a role to play. In that sense, Jenkins 
^proach to terrorist organisations becomes significant. In trying to understand the dynamics 
of the terrorist organisations in Punjab and Ksishmir, Oots's hypothesis about the capacity of 
terrorist organisations in accordance with their group size is usefril. He suggests that average 
group size is largest for difficult acts. Difficult acts are more likely than other acts to be 
committed by a larger group. There is some variance in group size from group to group. 
Although most organisations use a relatively small group. We find that Harkat-ul-Ansar and 
Hizbul Mujahideen are big organisations with intermediate group size. This allows them to 
perform tasks like attacking strong hold of Indian Security Forces, kidnapping and bomb 
blasts. Like Oots's finding that intermediate group gets injured in the acts of terror, we fmd 
that in the two organisations the individuals did get injured. 
What is not covered in Oot's understanding is the fact that certain terrorist 
organisations are created to counter other terrorist organisations. This was done in case of 
both Harkat-ul-Ansar and Hizbul Mujahideen. This leads us to a significant dimension of 
inter-organisational conflict among the terrorist groups. The logic of this conflict suggests 
that the movement is on the wane. 
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Inter and Intra organisational conflict exists leading to splits and new 
alignments. Every terrorist organis^on wants to gain the maximum publicity. The hijacking 
of IC-814 can be seen in this context. 
The characterstic of training of both groups is transnational. Both the terrorist 
organisations use a lot of explosives. The scientific and technological advancement in the art 
of making weaqjons demanded skilled manpower resources and proper training in the use of 
arms. Unless the group has under^ne proper training, it is not possible for a potential 
individual to carry out the action plan aimed to subvert an established political system. This 
training, along with weapons was provided by Pakistan and by Afghan Mujahideens to both 
the groups. 
Thus, we establish that both are part of state sponsored terrorism. The 
sufficient end sought here by the sponsoring state is not necessarily the total destruction of 
the targeted entity, but rather sunply to destabilize or weaken the target. The Kargil invasion, 
operation TOPAC have all been part of this strategy of Pakistan. This clearly represents the 
use of lethal force on the moral plane to dissolve a targeted entity. 
An important tactic of Pakistan is to link the Sikhs with the 
Kashmiri militants. The ISI is trying to bring the two to an agreement for joint action in 
India.They aim at co-ordination between the two subversions of the state. The relevance of 
this could be analysed by the fact that Jammu and Kashmir has sizeable population of Sikhs, 
and Pakistani leaders are frequently in touch with Sikh leaders abroad. By creating a nexus 
between the two, Pakistan's tactic is to divert the attention of the Indian army from either of 
the state so that total collapse of government machinery is ensured and civil war prevails. 
A well-trained force which has a large number of Afghan mercenaries along 
with the regular Pakistan Army, intruded across the LOC in the Kargil sector this year. They 
occupied heights which provided direct observation over NHl , the road which connects 
Srinagar with Leh via Zojila and Kargil. Their presence was discovered only in the first week 
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of May; action has since been on to evict them from our area. In the space available here all 
that can be said is that Pakistan has introduced a new dangerous element to the ongoing proxy 
war which can lead to an Indo-Pak war if not controlled in time. Failure in the Valley was 
perii£q)s the main cause which led Pakistan to extend the proxy war to Ladakh. 
Pakistan wishes to embarrass India by internationalising the Kashmir issue, 
projecting India as a violator of UN resolutions and accusing it of human rights violations. In 
pursuance of its objectives, the ISI is engaged in spreading the tentacles of terrorism not only 
in J&K but also in Punjab, Assam and Nagaland by carrying out subversive propaganda on 
fundamentalist and communal lines. The ISI has established operational links with drug 
syndicates and fundamentalist Islamic groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India after the 
Prankot massacre in April 1998, 
According to Ved Marwah, "The shift to Janunu is deliberate and is likely to 
continue. The number of foreign mercenaries is likely to increase in the coming months in the 
region, with more trained and experienced Afghan mujahideen being available for infiltration 
into the state. Harkat-ul-Ansar and Lashkar-e-Toiba have been operating there since 1993 and 
many more such groups have entered the Jammu region since then. What is called for is 
concrete action-an inunediate strengthening of the security arrangements in the region witii 
the active support of the state police and the civil administration."Since the setting up of the 
Unified Conmiand in J&K in December 1996 (after elections to the State Assembly in 
September 1996), with the Chief Minister of the State as the Chairman and the General 
Officers Commanding 15 and 16 Corps as Security Advisers, there has been much greater co-
ordination between the State Government, the Army and the CPOs in the fight against 
militancy. The re-vamped Jammu and Kashmir Police (JKP) and the better trained, equipped 
and motivated Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police (JKAP)34 have begun to operate in close 
co-ordination with tiie central security forces and greater synergy has been achieved in 
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counter-insurgency operations. The intelligence network has also been strengthened. The 
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has become more effective in co-ordinating intelligence 
acquisition, collation, analysis, syndesis and dissemination. 
There may or indeed has been unprincipled politics, rampant corruption, 
sluggish socio-economic development, but • this is not a sufficient reason to arouse 
secessionist overtures. It is a revoh that has been organized "yet" at times spontaneous on 
emotional issues like the disappearance of the religious relic from Hazratbal in 1963 and 
operation Bluestar in Punjab. Pakistan has not only encouraged it but provided state of the art 
weaponry, training and guidance. Infiltration across a porous border became easier than it had 
been when there was not the same level of dissatisfaction. Official and semi official, tacit and 
open support from Pakistan has left Kashmir and Punjab in a state of disarray. 
The international media has publicized the after effects of militancy as the 
causes for it - breakdown of civil authority, repression, violation of Human Rights, alienation. 
This satisfies the militants and whets the hope of international intervention. A disinformation 
campaign has been resorted to, to influence international opinion against India. Impartial 
observations regarding innocent killings, disruption of life are few. Censorship and official 
control of information has tended to give gust to bitterness and to complaints that Indian 
authorities are concealing a policy of brutal suppression. 
After the nuclear tests, the danger of open conventional warfare between India 
and Pakistan is now negligible, but support to and provocation of low intensity warfare will 
remain part of Pakistan's strategic objective for a long time to come. 
Organisations like the Harkat-ul Mujahideen or Harakat-ul Ansar are retained 
amongst 25 others in the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations, but when such jihadf 
organisations operate in Jammu and Kashmir they are not referred to as terrorist 
organisations, but as foreign organisations engaged in a struggle. 
The US is only concerned with terrorism if the lives of its citizens or 
properties belonging to its missions abroad or in the US are threatened. The US believes in 
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military strikes against terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan, but will not support the idea 
of similar action by India against the bases in Pakistan or for that matter either in Afghanistan 
or Pakistan occupied Kashmir 
Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism can be curbed by strong political international 
pressures viz. by promoting regional security agreements against terrorism. Sponsored 
terrorism poses danger to all the countries of South Asian region and they should be made 
aware of this fact through concerted efforts. Combined anti-terrorist programmes including 
sharing of information regarding terrorist bases and movements, their plans and objectives, 
will go a long way in checkings cross-border terrorism. A joint campaign against narco-
terrorism, smuggling of arms and explosives in the region too will greatly help in countering 
terrorism and insurgencies. All South Asian states must stand together to combat terrorism 
and sponsored low intensity conflicts. India should seize the initiative to give a practical 
shape to joint action against terrorists. 
It is also necessary to laimch a meaningftil counter-offensive against Pakistan's 
surrogate forces operating in J&K to neutralise and defeat Pakistan's political supporters. 
Pakistan's dubious designs to subjugate the state by use of surrogate forces should be 
exposed to the international community. 
An important step would be to establish the legitimacy of the state government m 
ttie eyes of the people through free and fair elections alongside political campaigns to 
convince the people that their legitimate aspirations will be respected. A corruption free and 
competent administration which is responsive to the people's needs and takes urgent steps to 
right the economic wrongs and improve the lot of the conmion man is essential. The 
government must guarantee protection agamst the terrorist guns by raising special forces and 
guards to protect villages and small townships in remote areas. 
A high priority must be assigned to improving economic conditions in rural areas, 
both in the Jammu and Kashmir regions. Land reforms, provision of uninterrupted electric 
supply, good transport system and availability of essential conmiodities will greatly help in 
winning people's confidence. A commonly articulated complaint of the Kashmiris has been 
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'who cares for us'. The government of the day must show that it not only cares but its 
determination to improve their lot. In the final analysis, the people must be won over. 
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